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Abstract
This thesis explores features of the Plan-A-Day (PAD) task by Funke & Krger (1993) and
presents an analysis of specific aspects of scheduling behavior.
The PAD task permits learning at a declarative as well as on a procedural level. Declarative
learning in the PAD domain can be conceptualized as the accumulation of experience about
the feasibility of partial schedules. An Òexplorative patternÓ is defined which characterizes a
scheduling process that implements the strategy of accumulating experience. Procedural
learning is hypothesized to take place at the level of the mental arithmetic that is necessary to
check schedules in advance (forward checking).
It is shown how declarative and procedural learning must work together to enhance
scheduling in the PAD task.
These assumptions are further investigated in two studies. In the first study, the Òexplorative
patternÓ defined in this thesis is confirmed by the analysis of empirical data. In this study, it
also showed that participants who explored little in their first PAD session performed worse
in the second session, while the performance of participants who explored much during the
first trial improved slightly. Furthermore, in this study a considerable increase of forward
checking between the two PAD sessions was found, confirming the assumption about forward
checking being the basic method in working with PAD.
In the second study, participants evaluated partial schedules. It showed that the feasibility of
other appointments is an important reason for evaluating partial schedules. However,
according to this study, the actual choice of an appointment is less related to forward checking
but to criteria of the appointments. This is interpreted as a qualification of the role of forward
checking as the basic skill underlying performance in PAD by implying that there is a
preliminary selection process that precedes it.
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1. Introduction and Objective of this thesis
The concept of planning is neither unambiguous, nor narrow. Consider a simple field study
(carried out by author, imaginary). If ten people were picked randomly and asked about their
first associations, given the term ÒplanningÓ, their answers would be likely to range from
dreamy confessions in the style of ÒMy husband and me are planning to move to FloridaÓ to
brusque statements like ÒI was just planning to eat this sandwich here when you came and
interrupted me with your question!Ò
However, some people would probably answer simply by giving details of the activities they
have planned to do during the present day, as this hypothetical student does:
ÒWell, I planned to go shopping, but only for an hour or so, because afterwards IÕll meet a
friend at the caf. Perhaps weÕll do something else afterwards. But I have to be home early
tonight, at 8 in the latest case, because tonight I have to prepare a presentation which I have to
give tomorrow, which means I will go to bed rather late and sleep rather little. The
presentation will be tomorrow morning, and if it goes well, IÕll have a little celebration
afterwardsÓ.
 This last type of ÒplanningÒ, with the flavor of Òlove in idlenessÓ that is so typical of the life
of students, closely resembles the type of planning that is operationalized in the task that is
used in this thesis: the Plan-A-Day task (Funke & Krger, 1993).
The Plan-A-Day task is, as its name already suggests, about the scheduling of several
activities during a day. These activities come with several constraints: They can be met only
at specific times, or between specific points of time. This is also true for the schedule our
imaginary student has described. The meeting with the friend is scheduled for a specific time,
and the student wants to be home Òat 8, in the latest caseÓ.
There is another element of scheduling, which is not mentioned explicitly in the statement
above, but nevertheless is of considerable importance. This is the distance between the
locations the appointments take place at. E.g., our student may have arrived at an estimate for
the time that is available to do shopping by calculating the distance from the shop to the caf,
where the friend will be waiting (and the distance from his/her current position to the
shopping destination as well). The appointments in the Plan-A-Day task also have distances
between them. They are also assigned specific priorities, i.e. they are not all equally (un-)
important. The fact that different appointments do have different priorities can also be
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restrict the duration of shopping to an hour. However, the presentation scheduled for the
following morning appears to be of even higher importance, as its success will be explicitly
celebrated. Furthermore, the student will probably discard after-coffee fun in town with the
friend in favor of properly preparing the presentation: another indicator of the top-level
priority of this ÒappointmentÓ.
What about the agonizing situation when two apparently equally important appointments take
place at approximately the same time, and there is no way to meet them both? Well, that
situation can also occur in the Plan-A-Day task. The task (or rather: the Interface, as Plan-A-
Day is of course implemented to run on a computer) does nothing to help participants come to
term with that that dilemma, as it does not yet contain a first aid therapeutic facility. All it can
do is to record participantsÕ eventual decisions in a log-file, which is interesting for the
researcher, but offers no real consolation to the participant.
Let me briefly interrupt my description of the Plan-A-Day task and give my reasons for
stressing its realistic features.
I hold (or rather: share) the view that any psychological (or, indeed, scientific) work
concerning itself with planning and scheduling that uses a specific task to assess human
behavior in these areas has to be very clear about the nature of this task. And this is also true
for this thesis. This is because the terms ÒplanningÓ and ÒschedulingÓ are often used to refer to
tasks, phenomena and findings that are considerably different from each other, which can lead
to false generalizations and erroneous ÒcontradictionsÓ. A (very) brief sketch of the concepts
of planning in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and Psychology may help to clarify that
point.
Hertzberg (1989, 1995) describes the development of the concept of planning in Artificial
Intelligence (AI). He mentions several problematic characteristics of real life planning and
scheduling domains. Among these characteristics are (e.g.) the dynamic nature of many tasks,
the necessity to find representations for the passage of time to be included in planning and
scheduling algorithms, or the fact that planners often have do deal with incomplete
information. These phenomena have led to a considerable diversification of the concept of
planning in AI, because one of the main objectives of that field lies in developing an efficient
planner for a specific domain, and as the demands of that domain change, so do the
characteristics of a planner.  Hertzberg (1995) concludes: ÒThere is no such thing as planning
h!Ó ( 91) d tl d d th t Ò d l f l i k t t th
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characteristics they implyÓ (p.92). He goes on to demand that Òeach model must explicitly
state its definition of a plan and of a problemÓ and clearly define its ÒOperatorkalklÓ (a
German term that is a bit hard to translate, meaning Òthe mechanism which is used to evaluate
the consequences of specific components of a plan, or the complete planÓ, p.92).
As planning and scheduling are research areas that have proved to be similarly challenging for
AI and psychology (see e.g. Akyrek, 1992; Funke & Fritz, 1995a; Hayes-Roth & Hayes
Roth, 1979; and Rattermann, 2001), it comes as little surprise that the diversification that
emerged in the field of AI-planning is also prevailing in the field of psychology. As
Sanderson (1989) states in a survey on human scheduling in the domain of job scheduling and
dispatching, the variety of tasks that are used assess human scheduling capabilities is vast
enough to make it impossible to classify studies of human scheduling according to the task
they use. Instead, Sanderson (1989) proposes more abstract criteria, e.g. the level of
scheduling expertise in the human sample that was assessed, or the amount of information
available to the participants.
Although this last point was made with regard to scheduling in the industrial/ human factors
domain, which, strictly speaking, is not equivalent to ÒpureÓ psychology, it nevertheless
applies to the situation in psychology as well. The tasks used in psychology can be
(outwardly) simple and context-free tasks like the Tower of Hanoi (Klix & Rautenstrauch-
Goede, 1967) or the Tower of London (Shallice, 1982). However, the family of scheduling
tasks also encompasses close relatives or even siblings of Plan-A-Day (e.g. the ÒA dayÕs
errandsÓ task used by Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979)). Finally, there are still more
complex scenarios mostly used in Dynamic System research, where planning is only one
among many relevant variables (see Funke, 2001 and Wallach, 1998, for overviews).
To add to the complexity of the planning/scheduling picture, the same task is often used in
different fields of psychology. E.g., the Tower of London and the Tower of Hanoi were both
used to assess planning impairments of patients suffering from prefrontal damage (for a
comparison, see Huchler, 1999). On the other hand, both ÒTowersÓ were (and still are) of
course widely used to assess basic cognitive processes in healthy adults (drawing an amusing
analogy to molecular genetics, Herbert Simon (1996) referred to the Tower of Hanoi as Òthe e.
-coli of cognitive psychologyÓ (chess being the drosophila) (p.226)). The emergence of
planning competence is also of interest to developmental psychologists, as can be seen in a
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recent work by Rattermann et al. (2001), which uses a task that resembles Plan-A-Day to
investigate the emergence of partial-order planning in children.
Finally, the extensive use of scheduling tasks in the field of personnel selection need not be
specially emphasized here, as it is well known (but see Funke & Fritz, 1995b, for a brief
overview).
In spite of their necessarily superficial character, the preceding paragraphs should suffice to
show that the collected research on planning and scheduling does indeed resemble a colorful
jungle full of diverse interesting specimens of scientific flowers, where only one thing seems
to be impossible: To answer the question that so boldly constitutes the title of this thesis,
ÒHow humans solve scheduling problemsÓ. ÒHumansÓ could be just adult, healthy humans,
but the term also should include children and neurological patients. ÒScheduling problemsÓ
can be based on realistic scenarios, like scheduling in Plan-A-Day, but they could also be
highly specific problems like the (simulated) control of a nuclear plant (cf. Wallach, 1998),
or, very purely and abstractedly, amusing little puzzles.
 So, how is the diversity-problem1 dealt with in this thesis, then?
One possible approach to introduce order into the Òjungle of planningÓ (ÒPlanungsgestrppÓ,
Funke & Fritz, 1995a, p.37) could be the design of a taxonomy of planning tasks and different
kinds of planning. Indeed, Funke & Fritz (1995a) offer some tentative ideas about the
dimensions that could be part of such a taxonomy. However, this thesis uses a different
approach, the essence of which can be found in its subtitle: ÒAnalysis of human behavior in
the Plan-A-Day taskÓ. In other words, I chose to concentrate my investigations of scheduling
on a specific task. This approach is in accordance with NewellÕs (1973) suggestion to learn as
much as possible from a single task. Such a choice is legitimate if
• the definition of the problem/ phenomenon within the task is clear and the characteristics
of the task (e.g. its difficulty) are made explicit2 and
• the task is realistic enough to cover at least a segment of the phenomenon in question that
could occur in real life.
And here we are again at the point from which we started this excursion, namely, the
importance of the realistic features of the Plan-A-Day task: They are important, because,
within the terminological boundaries of this thesis ÒschedulingÓ equals ÒPlan-A-Day-
                                                 
1 Or rather, less negatively, ÒphenomenonÓ or even ÒchallengeÓ
2 This is an explicit response to Hertzberg’s (1995) demands for clarity of definition and specification quoted
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behaviorÓ, but it would be nice if ÒPlan-A-Day-behaviorÓ at least partially equaled real
behavior.
So ÒHow humans solve scheduling problemsÓ should actually be read as Òhow healthy, adult
humans work with a scheduling task called Plan-A-DayÓ, and contain a generous amount of
task analysis.
However, I chose to focus my ambition to describe human scheduling in yet another way. In
this thesis I want to look at three specific aspects of the scheduling process. Firstly, I am
going to investigate how often and in what ways humans modify a schedule until they are
ÒsatisfiedÓ, and arrive at their solution. Do they make small, ÒlocalÓ changes to a schedule,
gradually optimizing it? Or do they tend to abandon schedules quickly, and take them up
again frequently?
Furthermore, I want to explore the extent of Òlooking aheadÓ that is employed in a task like
Plan-A-Day. How many steps in advance do people detect that the schedule they are currently
working on will lead to a dead end, i.e. that it will be impossible to include all the
appointments that have to be met?
A third objective of this thesis is to explore how people evaluate single appointments. If a set
of appointments is given, which appointments are evaluated to be good choices to start a
schedule with, and which are not? And which criteria are critical for this evaluation? How do
these evaluations correspond to the actual choices made by other people?
In focusing on these three aspects of scheduling, I follow suggestions made by Funke &
Krger (1993, 1995) in the course of their description of the Plan-A-Day task. The character
and the extent of schedule-modification and Òlook aheadÓ are mentioned explicitly as
plausible additional measures of the planning process that should be computed along with
those already provided by the Plan-A-Day system (Funke & Krger, 1993, p. 108)3. The
question of how humans evaluate partial schedules is mentioned as an additional option to
diagnose planning capabilities (Funke & Krger, 1995, p.118).
The fact that the (re-)construction of schedules, the extent of look-ahead and the evaluation of
single appointments or partial schedules were deemed worthwhile research-pursuits by the
authors of the task I worked with was an essential and important inspiration that guided my
analysis of the empirical data I collected in the course of writing this thesis. However, it was
How humans solve scheduling problems
not the only thing about these three phenomena that attracted my curiosity. I was particularly
fascinated by the ambivalent nature of modifying a schedule and looking ahead in time —
ÒambivalentÓ because they both are a necessary part of efficient scheduling, but can change
into a real obstacle when they are ÒoverdoneÓ. Consider the following example.
If I have, say, six appointments today, I must come up with a schedule to meet them, because
for this number of appointments, purely spontaneous behavior (Òoh, letÕs go to the Conference
first, it sounds like funÓ) can result in considerable loss of time and, subsequently, stress. So I
start building a schedule, using the information about the allotted time for the appointments
and the distances between them (perhaps I have a map, or someone told me, or I know my
way around in the city). With six appointments, it is unlikely that IÕll come up with the right
schedule immediately, especially since this scheduling involves a lot of mental arithmetic,
computing time estimates, etc., and IÕm not really superior at that. Now suppose I have to
write down that schedule, either for my own use (to take it with me, so I wont forget it on the
way), or for somebody else, maybe because I work as an assistant for somebody who is so
important that they canÕt be bothered with something as trivial as scheduling their daily
activities. Anyway, I have two options. I can either start sketching a tentative schedule, with
the danger of having to correct it later, crossing out appointments, making things a bit messy,
or carefully, carefully think about the appointments until I come up with a schedule that
certainly works, and write it down neatly and clearly and in one go. What should I do?
This question is really about the most appropriate extent of schedule modification, the
recommended number of steps to look ahead during scheduling, and the consequences of
both.
LetÕs address the look-ahead question first. Assume I choose to adopt the Òthink carefullyÓ -
strategy mentioned above. In this case, I can be lucky and arrive at a complete schedule by
accident. However, it is more likely that I have to think four or five steps into the future to be
really certain that the schedule will in fact work out. This not only sounds very straining, it is
also likely to lead to calculation errors, because I have to keep track of so many things at
once: The current time, the alternatives to the current appointment, the differences and sums
of the various times. No, looking ahead too far is not recommended, as it is hard work that is
not even guaranteed to succeed. However, the other extreme, a very limited amount of
looking-ahead (i.e. simply adding an appointment to the schedule that can be done at that
time) also has its pitfalls. While I can, again, strike it lucky and arrive at the complete
schedule for my appointments in time, I am now in danger arriving at a dead end
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unnecessarily often, because I havenÕt seen it coming in time. Moreover, IÕm now more likely
to have to repair large parts of my schedule, because I may have overlooked an appointment
that started very early, and could only be met until a relatively early time, and I have to insert
that appointment into the beginning of the schedule. It is easy to see that scheduling without
looking ahead is inefficient. However, too much looking ahead is a strain. Looking ahead is
useful only in moderation.
The question of modifications to a schedule can be answered in a similar vein: Like with
looking-ahead, moderation is the key here. Basically, I shouldnÕt modify a schedule without a
good reason, e.g. without knowing for sure that I canÕt meet some appointment. However,
who doesnÕt know the sudden urge to change a schedule and see how things work out when a
different appointment is placed first. These modifications can be useful, as they help to avoid
the danger of being stuck. Remember Francis Picabia, who said: ÒWhy is the skull round? To
enable thoughts to change direction!Ó But too many modifications to a schedule can not only
be a sign of severe problems of the scheduler, they are also a poor strategy. If I switch
between schedules starting with different appointments too often and too quickly, I cannot
collect knowledge about the appointments; I canÕt accumulate experiences about sequences of
appointments that are possible. However, these bits of knowledge would make things
considerably easier for me (which is probably another reason for the above-described urge to
Òchange directionsÓ occasionally). But if I modify one single schedule too often, I will be
stuck and persevere on a road that leads nowhere — perhaps only a tiny modification away
from the solution.
This necessity to maintain a delicate balance both in modifying a schedule and in looking
ahead in time interested me, because it so close to a notion of common sense, of flexible
human scheduling, as opposed to the mind-numbing search tree routines of algorithms4. And
so I wanted to take a closer look at just how humans modify their schedules.
 Let me now give a brief overview of the remainder of my thesis.
In the following chapter I will describe the Plan-A-Day task in more detail, the task
environment and Interface as well as the ways in which scheduling abilities are assessed by
                                                 
4 A rather unwarranted generalization made in the flow of polemics. In fact, there are many algorithms that are
sophisticated and not mind - numbing. A funny example is the ÒDynamic BacktrackingÓ Algorithm in Ginsberg
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the automatic evaluation processes implemented in the system. I will also introduce the
terminology used in the course of my own analyses throughout this thesis.
Task analysis will continue in chapter 3. I will discuss classical planning and Constraint
Satisfaction Search, as well as three ÓprominentÓ models of planning, the design of each
reflects a Ògrowing concern about cognitive plausibilityÓ (Akyrek, 1992, p.82). IÕll discuss
the memory-driven approach of Adaptive Planning (Altermann, 1988), inspired by Schank &
Abelson Õs (1977) script-theory, and Opportunistic Planning, a hybrid idea of Psychology and
AI, as well as an early example of Cognitive Modeling (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth 1979). I
will also review AndersonÕ s (1987) procedural view of skill acquisition (based on his ACT*
theory, 1983). I will use all these concepts in order to carry the ÒsuperficialÓ task analysis of
chapter 2 a little further by critically evaluating their appropriateness in the Plan-A-Day
context. From this assessment, I will deduce a proposal about the connection between
declarative and procedural learning in the domain of PAD, or, to put it more informally,
between the accumulation of experience and the improvement of performance.
After these task-analytical and theoretical musings, I will address the question of different
patterns of modifications in human scheduling behavior in chapter 4. The analysis presented
in this chapter partly derives from the ideas expressed in chapter 3. Apart from the obviously
interesting question Òhow many modifications do participants ÒneedÓ before they arrive at
their solutionÓ, it can also be analyzed why some participants take longer (in terms of
modifications) than others. Is it because they canÕt stop working with a single schedule? Is it
because they take up the same schedules over and over again, being stuck? Is it because they
try out too many different things, without actually succeeding? And, finally, is there
something like a Òscheduling styleÓ, i.e. are participants who take many modifications in a
first Plan-A-Day task likely to take long in the second task as well?  Or is it rather the
scheduling-patterns that are consistent across the different tasks? Put a bit more casually: are
the modifications systematic or scattered?
The phenomenon of Òlooking-aheadÓ will be addressed in chapter 5.
In this chapter I will describe an experiment I conducted to test how people evaluate single
appointments at the start of a schedule. This experiment uses the same Plan-A-Day tasks (i.e.
the same appointments) that were used in the study described in chapter 4. This makes it easy
t t t if th f f d i th di t d b li t d b th l ti
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given in the experiment, which was one of its objectives. However (more interesting), people
in the experiment were also asked to give reasons for their evaluations. It will therefore be
possible to test if these evaluations are really rooted in participantsÕ assessment of the future
situation (looking-ahead), or if other, more simple criteria are enough.
In the experiment, people were also asked to pick the next appointment, given a schedule
starting with a specific appointment, and to give their reasons for this as well. This further
differentiates participantsÕ reasoning in evaluating the next appointment, because the
evaluation of (anotherÕs) already existing schedule is not quite the same as building a
schedule from scratch. Looking-ahead may play a role in the evaluation of otherÕs efforts,
while simple priority rules (cf. Sanderson, 1989) may be enough to choose the next
appointment.
 Finally the findings are summarized in chapter 6, focusing on the question that perhaps
would make the best title for this thesis after all: Is human scheduling any good?
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2 The Plan-A-Day Task
This chapter contains a detailed description of the task that is used to assess scheduling throughout this thesis:
The Plan-A-Day task, or PAD for short (Funke & Krger, 1995). The external features of the task are described,
e.g. the characteristics of the Interface, the amount of information that is available to the subjects, the setup of
the situation the subject is placed in, and the wording and contents of the instructions. This description should
provide the reader who is unfamiliar with the Plan-A-Day task with a clear concept of what it is like to deal with
the task as a participant.
In addition, the format of the log-data collected by the PAD-System will be discussed shortly, in order to
introduce properly the terminology that will be used in the subsequent chapters to describe, explain and predict
human scheduling behavior. Finally, this section also includes a list of abbreviations for the appointments
featured in two specific PAD tasks, because the subsequent chapters will extensively refer to these two specific
tasks.
2.1 Development of PAD and special features of the task
PAD was developed by Funke and Krger (1993), originally with the purpose to devise a
diagnostic instrument for the assessment of planning and scheduling capabilities of executive
personnel. However, a special version of PAD, the ÒPAD-RehaÒ, was designed explicitly as a
means to make a diagnosis for patients with neuropsychological deficits (see Huchler, 1999,
as well as Kohler, Poser & Schnle, 1995, for an evaluation).
Both the development of the ÒStandardÓ -PAD and the PAD- Reha result from the authors
wish to extend and improve diagnostic instruments that already exist in the area of scheduling.
PAD is very similar to an earlier ÒDisposition-taskÓ by Jeserich (1981). In this task, several
places have to be visited in the course of an afternoon, e. g. the grocery-store (to buy food),
the doctor (to have a routine health check), and the hairdresser (for obvious reasons). The
participant in this task has to order these appointments in a way that enables them to meet
them all. A bicycle can be used once, to reduce the distance between two appointments to a
third, however, as this bicycle is broken and has to be repaired first, the use of this device also
requires additional time and, as such, must be considered carefully.
As Funke and Krger (1993) argue, PAD, while maintaining the basic framework of this
Disposition-task, improves it in several crucial ways: Firstly the appointments in PAD are
more similar to the appointments one is likely to encounter during a working Day. Instead of
buying milk at the grocery store, the participants have to (e.g.) attend a Conference, dictate a
letter to the Secretary and meet their boss at the Central Office Secondly the different
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appointments have different priorities, also a familiar feature of Òreal-lifeÓ obligations. The
different priorities of the appointments are also used to qualify the evaluation of the schedules
participants produce in the PAD task. Sometimes, it is not possible to meet all scheduled
appointments for one day, which means that the participants have to select a subset of
appointments they want to meet. This is another realistic feature of the PAD task, as the
difficult and crucial aspects of scheduling often lie in deciding between two or more
conflicting appointments. A third modification from the Disposition task is the ÒexchangeÓ of
the bicycle in favor of a car. Like the bicycle in Jeserichs (1981) original task, the car can be
used once each day, and reduces the distance between two appointments to a third.
A fourth group of modifications serves to enhance PADÕs diagnostic quality: The participants
are required to schedule appointments for two (instead of (only) one) days, in order to
improve the assessment of their scheduling abilities by means of repeated measurement.
Furthermore, the difficulty of the individual ÒdaysÓ (i.e. the number of appointments and the
conflicts between them) can easily be changed according to specific research interests. Even
the words describing the appointments themselves can be changed in that manner. Finally,
PAD not only provides a measure of the participantsÕ performance, i.e., the results of their
scheduling. It also provides a means to analyze the scheduling process itself, because it
generates a log-file for each participant. This log-file holds every keystroke the participants
make. This enables the interested researcher, such as the author, to address specific questions
about the scheduling process, in addition to the quality of the results (i.e. the final schedules
participants create). (An account of the ways human scheduling can be evaluated by the PAD
system will be given in section 2.4. However, as most analytic procedures that were used in
this thesis were not a part of the default options already implemented in PAD, but were
instead programmed by myself5 for the specific purposes of this work, this account will be not
as thorough as the subject matter would warrant. However, Funke and Krger (1993) give a
very clear and detailed description of the evaluation options provided by PAD.)
                                                 
5 With one notable exception that has to be mentioned here: The data described in chapter 3, section 3.1 were
obtained by using a program (ÒEinlesÓ) written by my fellow student Jan Zwickel, for whose help and assistance
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2.2 Options for the configuration of PAD
PAD was written in Turbo Pascal 6.0 and runs under MS DOS or Windows6. Along with
PAD come 16 pre-installed numbered sets of appointments. These sets of appointments differ
with respect to their size. Additionally, there is one set of appointments (Ò0Ó) that is used as
an ÒexerciseÓ and is presented to the participants prior to their regular work with PAD, in
order to familiarize them with the system, the use of the correct keys, the demands of the task,
etc.
It is possible to configure PAD to suit specific research interests and/ or the characteristics of
the population whose scheduling behavior is to be assessed (e.g. healthy participants vs.
neurological patients).
PADÕs configuration options include the number of the two sets of appointments one wishes
to present to the participants, as well as the ÒdifficultyÓ of the task. This last parameter can be
varied from level 1 (easy) to level 4 (very difficult). The difficulty as conceptualized as the
presence/ absence of helpful information that is available to the participants while they solve
the task.  This information is designed to reduce the load on the participantsÕ memory. E.g.
the times at which the appointments can be met may be shown explicitly on the screen during
the PAD-session. On difficulty level 0, all helpful information is available, on level 4 none.
This point will be expanded a little more in the next section, where the actual PAD Interface
will be described (and shown).
Other configuration options are the amount of time participants are given to schedule the
appointments, and the turning on/off of a sound that warns them if their allotted time is about
to run out. It is also possible to specify how many minutes prior to that moment the warning
should occur. A last parameter is the running time; it can be specified if the passage of time is
shown to the participant at the top of the screen or not.
After these technical details, we can launch into the PAD task, as a participant experiences it:
the description of the PAD Interface.
                                                 
6 Or, as was the case in the experiment discussed in chapter 5, under Mac OS 9, using Virtual PC 4.0.
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2.3 Scenario: A day in the PAD-World7
At the beginning of a PAD session, the participants sit down in front of the Computer and
enter their name, age and gender (of course they do not have to enter their real names). After
that, they are presented with the instruction, which can be summarized thus: The participants
are asked to imagine themselves as employee of a company, who has to meet a number of
appointments during a fictitious day. They are encouraged to meet as many appointments as
possible. The appointments all take place within the area of the company, which consists of
several buildings that are scattered over a wide area.
Participants are informed that each appointment can only be met at a specific time, or in a
specific Òtime frameÓ. They are also prompted to the fact that the scheduling of these
appointments must take into account the distances between the respective locations. The
option to take the car for one distance is mentioned.
After that, there follows an explanation of the possibilities to move between the locations in
the PAD Interface by holding down the key that bears the first letter of the destination.
Participants are told that they can always view the set of appointments they have to schedule,
as well as general help, by holding down function keys. The option to delete moves and
modify schedules is mentioned as well.
Now, the participants are presented with the exercise-trial that precedes the actual testing.
This exercise consists of three appointments that have to be scheduled. Although the schedule
itself is not hard to find, it involves the correct use of the drive-by-car option, which serves to
prompt participants again at the importance to use that strategic device correctly. Only after
having found the correct schedule are the participants allowed to enter the ÒregularÓ part of
the PAD-Test. As already mentioned, it consists of two ÒdaysÓ for which appointments have
to be scheduled.
This may be the appropriate moment to introduce the two sets of appointments that were used
to obtain human data, in the study described in chapter 4 as well as in the experiment
described in chapter 5. In the PAD system, they bear the numbers 4 and 5, so they will from
now on be referred to as PAD 4 and PAD 5. The instructions for PAD 4and PAD 5 are shown
                                                 
7 I first read he term ÒPAD-WorldÓ in the Diploma thesis of my fellow student Wolfram Schenck (2001), which
presents a connectionist model of planning in the domain of PAD. There, the term ÒPAD worldÓ is used to
describe the PAD as a kind of Microcosm, with its own definitions, terminology and cause-effect-relations.
Formulations like Òin the context of the PAD taskÓ, Òwithin the Domain of PADÓ, are synonymous, but not half
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in figure 2.1. As the analysis of these two sets of appointments is a crucial part of this thesis,
and accordingly requires considerable space and elaboration, the differences between PAD 4
and PAD 5 (or, indeed, their characteristics) will not be commented upon here, but, instead,
be analyzed more thoroughly in chapter 3.
PAD 4
• You have to be at the Storehouse between 10.00 a.m and 0.15 p.m. It will take you 10 minutes. ItÕs
important.
• Between 11.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m you have to visit the Secretary. It will take you 10 minutes.
•  You have to be at the Conference at 1.00 p.m, in the latest case. The Conference will last until
2.00 p.m. ItÕs very important.
•  You have to be at the Administration building at 2.30 p.m. It will last 90 minutes. ItÕs very
important.
• Between 10.00 and 4.00 p.m., you have to be at the Printing Office. This will take you 90 minutes.
ItÕs very important.
PAD 5
• Between 1.30 p.m and 2.30 p.m., you can meet a customer at the cafeteria. The talk will last 30
minutes. ItÕs important.
• Between 11.00 a.m. and 14.00 p.m you have to show up at the Office and deal with the files there.
You will need 60 minutes for this. ItÕs very important.
• You have to be at the Conference at 11.30 a.m, in the latest case. The Conference will last until
0.15 p.m. ItÕs important.
• Between 10.00 a.m. and 4.15 p.m. you have to meet your boss at the Central Office. He wants to
see you for 10 minutes. ItÕs very important.
• Between 10.00 a.m and 4.00 p.m., you have to be at the Administration. The work there will take
55 minutes. ItÕs important.
• Between 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. you are to come to the Printing Office and copy a book. This
will take 10 minutes
Figure 2.1. Descriptions of the appointments as they appear to the participants. Of course, participants are presented
with one set of appointments at a time.
After having read the instructions, the participants may enter the actual PAD environment.
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in minutes) between them. The subjects co-ordinate the subtasks by Òmoving toÓ the
respective locations (as already mentioned, they do this by typing the first letter of the
destination).
Each move results in a change of PAD system time, reflecting real-time relations and
discrepancies between the subtasks. The subjects are allowed to delete and modify their
moves, and declare their schedule finished, at any time. After that, they switch to the next
ÒdayÓ. If a subject hasnÕt decided on a final schedule, this switch occurs automatically after
fifteen minutes (there are two announcements that Òtime is running outÓ before that).
LetÕs take a closer look at the PAD-interface, which is shown below.
Figure. 2.2: PAD Interface.
The position of the little square shows that the participant is currently at the caf. The
locations on the map, which are colored white instead, of gray are locations at which a
scheduled appointment hasnÕt been met yet. The times at which the appointments can be met
are displayed in the roof of the respective houses. Below the locations, the distance from the
participantÕs current location is given in minutes.
In the upper right part of the screen (headed ÒTerminplanerÓ), the current state of the system
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current schedule, including the times of arrival and departure for the individual locations. It
can be seen that, before the visit to the caf, the participant has already been to the
Storehouse, the Administration, the Central Office, the Secretary and his/ her own office — so
s/he is lucky that the current appointment is taking place at a location where caffeine supply is
imminent.
Every time the participant moves to another location and adds this location to the schedule,
this moves and the times associated with it (arrival and departure) will be added to the
ÒTerminplanerÓ (schedule). If the participant deletes a move, it is also deleted from the
schedule, so abandoned schedules are not retained on the screen but have to be stored in
memory.
In the lower right part of the screen, the functions of several keys are listed: The participants
are, again, reminded that they can move to a location by pressing the key bearing its first
letter, and which keys they have to hit to take another look at this days appointments, to
obtain general help about the system, to delete a move, to declare the schedule finished and,
finally, to take the car for the next move.
The participants receive direct feedback about their scheduling behavior only if they have
made an ÒimpossibleÒ move. ÒImpossibilityÒ is restricted to the case that the participant
arrives at a location after the last possible point of time to meet this appointment has expired.
The participants receive no general feedback about the quality of their schedules, nor are they
forced to do every subtask within a day. Thus, apart from the possibility-constraint, the
resulting schedule is up to the participant.
2. 4 How human scheduling is assessed by PAD
2.4.1 Performance
As already hinted at before, PAD provides several options to evaluate participants scheduling
behavior, which shall be described here briefly.
For the quality of the solutions (i.e. the final schedules participants come up with), a weighted
and a transformed score are computed. The weighted score is the sum of appointments met,
weighted by the priorities associated with these appointments (no priority
mentioned/unimportant = 1; important = 3; very important = 8). The transformed score is
created to take into account the fact that it is possible to achieve a considerably high score
even without paying attention to the appointmentsÕ priority. It is computed thus: the
How humans solve scheduling problems
subtracted from the actual score, and two divides the remainder. Thus, the higher scores are
transformed to take on values between 0 and 10.
During the course of planning, many participants create schedules that are ÒbetterÓ (i.e. yield a
better score) than their final schedule. As it would be unfair to ignore this, a weighted and
transformed Score is computed for the best schedule found by the participant as well. These
scores are called the weighted and transformed ÒMax ScoreÓ, as opposed to the analogously
computed weighted and transformed ÒEnd ScoreÓ.
2.4.2 Process: Heuristics and more (a peep into the future)
Funke and Krger (1995, 1995) repeatedly emphasize the importance of analyzing the
scheduling process (as a whole) instead of only assessing the results of that process. Thus,
they state that Òthe (Log-files) are of special relevance for future scientific investigationsÓ
(Funke & Krger, 1993, p 9). They suggest a number of interesting possibilities for an
analysis of the Log-files. The proposal to systematically investigate the extent of schedule
construction/modification and looking ahead has already been mentioned in the introduction
to this thesis and needs no further highlighting here. However, it is interesting to note here
that Funke & Krger (1995) already make an intuitively appealing distinction between a
spontaneous ÒrestartÓ in the scheduling process (a schedule is discarded completely and
another is developed) and a local modification/ optimization of an already existing schedule.
They also offer a preliminary explanation of the first kind of behavior as an example of Òad-
hocismusÓ sensu Drner (1989), while the second approach receives the slightly more
favorable classification as specimen of evolutionary Optimization (as in DNA Computing, see
e.g. Pisanti (1997) for an overview). While the question of the relative utility of the two
manners of schedule modification is certainly open to discussion, the distinction itself is
inspiring, which is of course the reason I chose to pursue it in this thesis.
The two proposals mentioned above were the two suggestions made by Funke & Krger
(1995) that bear the most relevance to, and are dealt with, in this thesis. There are many roads
that are yet non-pursued in the jungle of human planning and scheduling. However, an
interesting tool to analyze the Log-files collected by PAD is already implemented in the
system: It is possible to measure which heuristics are likely to have influenced the choice of
the next appointment during the course of planning.
While Funke and Krger (1993, 1995) specify nine plausible heuristics that may influence
scheduling behavior in the domain of PAD, only five of these have been included in the PAD-
t l th t l h i ti d i th f l i Th li t d b l
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• Meet the closest appointment first (minimize distances)
• Use the Car for a long distance to maximize the resulting advantage
• Meet the (very) important appointments first (mind priority)
• Meet the most urgent appointments first (mind urgency)
• Avoid too much waiting time
It is easy to see that the use of heuristics (1) — (3) can be deduced after each move simply by
inspecting the appointment that has actually been picked. This is the case, because each of the
last three heuristics exploits one of the criteria that is associated with all appointments (in the
description of the appointments for one day, the earliest and latest possible time to meet them
are mentioned, as well as their priority). Thus, at each moment during the course of
scheduling, one or more appointments can be found achieve the score Ò1Ó given the
application of one of the first three heuristics (i.e. the most urgent appointment, the most
important appointment, etc.). The other two heuristics use internal system information, but
they can be implemented in any computer program that represents the distances between the
locations in a suitable data-structure.
The results of the analysis of heuristic application are summarized in the following manner:
the average ranking (computed using all choices made during the course of scheduling) for
each heuristic is compared with a value that would be associated with that heuristic if the
choices of the participants were completely random. Because the choice of an appointment
that ranks highest (Ò1Ó) with respect to a heuristic is taken as evidence for the application of a
heuristic, a low average value for a heuristic indicates a higher frequency of its use.
The option to analyze the Log-files with regard to specific heuristics in order to assess their
overall application is both interesting and neat. The approach to implement the analysis
directly in the system, so that it can be performed automatically, combined with the very clear
and specific description of the heuristics themselves, avoids many of the dangers of verbal/
written protocol analysis (e.g. loss of information, low inter-rater reliability, ambiguity).
(However, many of these dangers will be encountered again in chapter 5.)
It is also possible to easily test specific hypotheses about the predominance of a heuristic,
given a specially constructed PAD task, or some other, more sophisticated, experimental
intervention.
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An especially interesting application of the heuristic facility lies in the field of Cognitive
Modeling. To accurately fit and predict the preference for specific heuristics, and the overall
distribution of scores for the five implemented heuristics, is an extraordinarily sublime test for
any cognitive model. An example of this approach can be found in the Diploma Thesis of
Wolfram Schenck (2001), in which a connectionist model of human scheduling in the PAD
domain is presented. Although this model has some (minor) problems8, it amazingly fits not
only measures of human performance in the PAD task, but also predicts various measures of
the scheduling process, e.g. the distribution of operator use (=moves to the locations) and the
proportions of being on time or too late. SchenckÕs model also predicts the use of the
individual heuristics. While this may be an artifact of the ambiguity resulting from the
simplicity of the heuristics (see paragraph below), it nevertheless renders considerable support
to his model. Furthermore, it is easy to think of research objectives that involve the
development of Cognitive models of (e.g.) the dominance of specific heuristics under
different conditions (e.g. low versus high time pressure). The heuristic-analysis facility
implemented in PAD makes it easy to test the predictive value of such models.
However, in spite of all the advantages that come with the present analysis of heuristics, the
kind of heuristics that were described above may be insufficient to describe human
scheduling, because they are both too simple and too specific (they only take one criterion of
the appointments into account). Huchler (1999, p. 74) has already hinted at the fact that
adhering to only one heuristic is not sufficient so solve a PAD task. She also states that the
heuristics are not mutually exclusive, and uses the example of the heuristic Òto meet as many
appointments as possibleÓ (pp. 91-92). This heuristic clearly requires adherence to other
ÒsubÓ— heuristics as well, e.g. to the heuristic to minimize the distances and the waiting time.
Another problem with such Òsimple heuristicsÓ concerns the analysis of empirical data with
regard to the application of these heuristics. The following problem arises: one criterion taken
individually, be it the distance, the start-time, or another, allows no unambiguous ranking
between the appointments, if the other criteria arenÕt taken into account as well. As long as
this information is neglected, an appointment can rank ÒhighestÓ according to two different
heuristics (=criteria), and the same heuristic can ÒfavorÓ two different appointments. This
causes ambiguity in the automatic analysis of the heuristics, and makes it difficult to draw
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definite conclusions about the reasons that were really determining participantsÕ choices of
the next appointments, let alone make predictions about them.
For now, however, it should be stated that, despite these problems, the heuristic-analysis
option that is realized in PAD is a promising step in the most interesting direction of human
scheduling research. Perhaps this thesis can serve to provide some inspiration on how to
enhance and extend this analytical method.
2.5 The Structure of the Log-files, some useful terminology and list of abbreviations
This last section of chapter 2 will be devoted to the introduction of the terminology that will
be used in the remainder of the thesis to describe human scheduling behavior in the PAD
World. This terminology is not based on any definitions already made in the literature on
scheduling, and neither do I have the intention to propose it as some kind of standard. The
terms I chose were intuitively plausible to me, and I hope this applies to the reader as well.
Their purpose lies in making the explanations and discussion that follow in the subsequent
chapter as clear and evident as possible.
To provide the reader not only with terminology, but also with a clear picture of what these
terms designate, I will introduce this terminology using an (imaginary) Log-file as an
example. The terms that will be relevant throughout the remainder of this thesis are printed in
bold Italics.
Consider the following plausible excerpt from a Log-file9:
• Move to the Conference
• Delete the move to the Conference
• Move to the Storehouse
• Move to the Caf
• Move to the Secretary
• Delete the move to the Secretary
• Move to the Administration
• Move to the Secretary
• Delete the move to the Secretary
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• Delete the move to the Administration
• Delete the move to the caf
• Delete the move to the Storehouse
• Move to the Administration (...)
Figure 2.3:  Imaginary Log-file, ÒrawÓ format. This format very closely approximates an english
translation of the German original, the format being a little neater.
It is possible to gradually transform such a Log-file in a Lisp-like List-structure, which holds
almost the same information as the ÒrawÓ file, with the additional benefits of making some
details of the process more obvious and easy to detect.
Prior to the analyses described in chapter 4, all empirical data were transformed into this Lisp-
compatible format, as the analytic procedures themselves were programmed in Lisp.
Table 2.1: Transformation of a PAD Log-File into a Lisp-like List. Explanation is given in
the text.
Intermediate ÒabbreviatedÓ version of the
Log-file
Lisp-like List-structure
Conference (delete)
Storehouse
Cafe
Secretary (delete)
Administration
Secretary
(delete delete delete delete)
Administration
(Conference)
(Storehouse Caf Secretary)
(Storehouse Caf Administration Secretary)
(Administration)
Several things about this transformation are notable, the first being that the deletions of moves
are no longer explicitly mentioned in the Lisp-structure. Instead, the following information
can be drawn from the latter without so much as a second glance:
First, there is the number of modifications made to a schedule. This is simply equivalent to
the number of new lists generated. In the example, there are four lists, which means that there
have been four modifications to the schedule. Note that a new list is created only if an element
i d l d d h i dd d f d A d l i ddi i d ffi
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create a new list. This is relevant in the fourth chapter, when the issue of modifications of a
schedule will be examined in more detail. The schedules that are being modified, i.e. all
schedules apart from the last schedule, which is the solution, are simply called partial
schedules (no need to be overtly creative here). The complete schedule (partial schedules and
solution) will be referred to as, indeed, complete schedule.
In the example, we also see two instances of a special kind of modification: A complete
restart, or switch (to put it a little less formal). This means that a partial schedule that starts
with an appointment is abandoned and another appointment is placed at the start of the
schedule. A complete restart takes place after the move to the Conference and after the two
partial schedules that start with ÒStorehouseÓ.
It is now time to introduce the concept of modification-extent. The term Òmodification-
extentÓ describes an appointment. It is used to describe how many modifications to partial
schedules starting with that specific appointment exist within a given course of scheduling. In
our example, the modification extent of the appointment at the Storehouse is 2; the
modification extent of the appointments at the Conference and at the Administration is 1. This
will be relevant with regard to the questions about local optimization vs. discarding a
schedule: Obviously, the greater the modification-extent of an appointment is, the more local
modifications/ optimization-attempts are associated with it. The interpretation of this measure
must, however, be qualified thus: In the case that the modifications of a partial schedule
starting with a specific appointment are discarded in favor of another appointment, but
resumed later, it must be differentiated between the overall modification-extent and the
longest modification phase. The latter designates the longest uninterrupted modification-
extent of an appointment during the scheduling process of a single participant (algorithm), the
former is the sum of all modification-phases of an appointment during this scheduling
process. This is important to distinguish between continuous work on a partial schedule and
frequent discarding and resuming of schedules. Specific ideas about the behavior underlying
the possible combinations of a long/short longest modification phase and a small/ large
overall modification extent will be expressed concisely (and used for data-analysis and
interpretation) in chapters 3 and 4.
Three other terms are important. Firstly, there is the modification-length, that is, you guessed
it, the length of a modification. The average modification-length for a participant can be
computed, as well as the average modification-length for an appointment and a group of
participants. In the Log-file above, the average modification-length of the appointments at the
C f d th Ad i i t ti i 1 th difi ti l th f th i t t t
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the Storehouse is 3,5. The average modification-length of the ÒparticipantÓ is approximately
2,2. This measure can be important to test assumptions about the length of specific
modifications, as well as differences in the average modification-length between groups of
participants.
Secondly, there is the variety, which designates how many different modifications there are in
a course of scheduling, i.e. how many different appointments are placed at the beginning of a
schedule during the course of scheduling. This measure is important to qualify the number of
restarts. Consider the example log-file again. In this protocol, we find two restarts and a
variety of three (three different modifications): One modification of the Conference and the
Administration each, and two of the Storehouse. This indicates many restarts, as well as a
high variety. It is, however, also imaginable that a participant produces many restarts, but
little variety, e.g. by switching between two appointments, which indicates different
scheduling behavior. The relevance of this distinction should be obvious. Chapter 4 will
address the question which kind of scheduling behavior is actually exhibited by humans, and
how these measures (variety and restarts) correlate  with the number of modifications.
Thirdly, the possibility of the modifications is of course interesting. This measure indicates if
the schedulers have arrived too late at the latest appointment of a modification, or if they were
in time. In the latter case, the possibility, is t (true) and in the former case (of course) nil. As
the protocol above is a product of fantasy, it is not possible to exemplify this notion, however,
the interpretation of this measure can be explained thus: a low number of possibilities can
indicate either insufficient look-ahead or sloppy pre-calculation. A high number of
possibilities in a course of scheduling is a somewhat ambient phenomenon: If it correlates
with a high number of modifications, it may indicate unnecessarily many modifications or
restarts, when it correlates with a low number of modifications, it could indicate ÒgoodÓ look-
ahead (i.e. correct calculations).  These musings are beyond the scope of this chapter, and will
be elaborated in the two subsequent chapters in more detail.
2.5.1 A small problem
There is one problem (or rather: peculiarity) about the Lisp-like format of the log files.
Consider the following two modifications:
(Storehouse printing-Office cafe Conference)
(Storehouse printing-Office Conference Secretary)
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It is not possible to determine if the person who produced these two modifications has only
deleted the last two appointments in the first modification (the cafe and the Conference), and
has inserted the Conference and Secretary afterwards, or if (s)he has deleted the complete
schedule and re-entered it (ÒStorehouse, printing-OfficeÓ) before adding the two last
appointments. This could constitute a problem, because the latter would formally be a restart,
while the former is a local modification. However, I hold the view that as long as I chose to
pursue a particular path of scheduling (as, in this case, to start my schedule with the
appointments Storehouse and Printing Office), it is secondary whether I re-enter that schedule
or whether I maintain it and modify its latter part. The critical fact is the maintenance of this
schedule.
I also want to add that the PAD Interface makes it much more plausible to maintain the
beginning of a schedule (instead of deleting and re-entering the complete schedule only
because I want to change something at the end). The build-in ÒTerminplanerÓ makes it easy to
maintain the beginning of a schedule and only make changes where it is necessary, and my
observations during the studies I carried out for this thesis confirms this.
The assumption that participants maintain the beginning of a schedule and do not re-enter it
every time they modify it is further supported by some data reported by Wolfram Schenck
(2001). He reports the average number of successive deletions participants10 exhibited in PAD
4 and PAD 5. This number is 2.2 for both PAD 4 and PAD 5 (p.71). Additionally, in my own
analysis of the (same) data I found that the average length of partial schedules in both PAD 4
and PAD 5 is 4. That makes it extremely unlikely that participants delete the complete
schedule every time.
Schenck (2001) offers additional evidence for this absence of complete deletions. According
to his analysis (pp.71 — 73), the number of complete deletions of a schedule is only
approximately 3, for both PAD 4 and PAD 5.
However, I admit that the problem described in this paragraph introduces some ambiguity into
the subsequent data-analysis. This was one of the reasons to introduce the measure of variety
to qualify the measure of the restarts. The subsequent data-analysis will thus rely for the most
part on those two measures, which are, in combination, not ambiguous.
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2.5.2 List of abbreviations of the appointments
 The following table holds an overview of all appointments that have to be scheduled in PAD
4 and PAD 5. Although these two PAD tasks partly involve identical appointments (middle
column), the times at which these appointments take place is not the same in PAD 4 and PAD
5.
Table 2.2: Overview of the appointments in PAD 4 and PAD 5, with abbreviations.
Appointments in PAD 4 Appointments in PAD4 and
PAD5
Appointments in PAD5
Secretary: S
Storehouse : St
Printing Office: PO
Conference: CO
Administration: AD
Cafe: C
Central Office: Cent
Office: O
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3 Theoretical Musings
This chapter is devoted to a more detailed analysis of PAD. I attempt a theoretical classification of the behavior
PAD elicits.
I will first analyze PAD as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem and show how the criteria of its appointments will
influence the difficulty of a PAD task.
Afterwards, I will compare PAD to the paradigm of classical planning. While the PAD scenario meets many
constraints that prevail in this paradigm, the task itself is closer to a problem-solving task than to planning per se.
I will then examine three theoretical and computational approaches that claim to be both cognitively plausible
and efficient in dealing with particularly complex tasks: ÒAdaptive PlanningÓ (Altermann, 1988) which derives
from Schank & Abelson Ôs (1977) Script theory, ÒOpportunistic PlanningÓ described by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-
Roth (1979) and AndersonÕ s (1987) concept of skill acquisition -based on his ACT* (1983) theory- which states
that domain-specific skills are the result of weak problem solving methods that operate on general declarative
knowledge people have about a task or domain.
I will use all these approaches to guide further analysis of behavior in the PAD world. Specifically, I will
investigate the role of declarative and procedural learning in PAD. Declarative learning in the PAD domain is
conceptualized as the accumulation of experience, which is achieved by exploration, i.e. trying out partial
schedules. Procedural learning in the domain of PAD concerns the speedup of the mental arithmetic that is
applied in the selection of the next appointment. I will show how these two kinds of learning can work together
to produce good scheduling, as the development of the latter skill enhances the quality of the exploration.
3.1 The Complexity of PAD and its non-existent consequences
To show that a problem is NP complete, the usual strategy is to show that another problem,
the NP-Completeness of which is already known, can be reduced to the problem in question
(see, e.g., Sipser, 1997, for the general procedure, and Garey & Johnson, 1979, for a
collection of NP complete problems with the respective proofs). In the case of PAD, the
classic Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) offers itself. I will not give a formal
(mathematical) proof here, but instead outline the main argument of the reduction, which is
sufficient for the current purpose.
The TSP can be stated in the form of the following yes/no question: Given a map depicting
various cities, which are connected by roads of variable length, is there a path that connects
all cities and that is shorter than a fixed length ÒdÓ?
Any TSP can be changed into a PAD problem by using the following transformations: The
cities are the appointments (which, for the sake of the argument, take zero time). The roads
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are the distances between the appointments. The distance ÒdÓ is the time from 10 a.m until the
latest possible time to do an appointment.
Of course, although this argument is Òrelatively straightforwardÓ, the resulting PAD-task is Òa
bit of a strange task, without any constraints and zero-time appointmentsÓ (both quotations
courtesy of Niels Taatgen, personal conversation). As we have seen in the preceding chapter,
the existence of constraints (i.e. Òtime windowsÓ) is an important defining characteristic of a
PAD-task. The same holds true for the duration of the errands, which naturally has to be
included in PAD to maintain its much-stressed realistic context. This shows that the
consequences of PADÕs NP-completeness only take effect in a highly constructed worst
case.11
This is not only true for PAD, however. Most instances of NP-complete problems come with
constrains that make it easier for machines or humans to cope with them. This ÒcopingÓ is
usually referred to as ÒConstraint Satisfaction SearchÓ (CSS), and the respective problem is
called a ÒConstraint Satisfaction ProblemÓ (CSP) (e.g. Russell & Norvig, 1995, p. 83, p.104).
Let me explain the concept of a CSP using PAD as an example12.
A CSP is usually stated as a set of variables, a set of possible values, and a set of constraints
that the values have to obey. The problem solver must assign a (set of) value(s) to each
variable in such a way that no constraint is violated.
Just exactly in which way one wants to map a particular problem onto the CSP formalism is
always a bit of an arbitrary matter. In the course of writing this thesis I have devised multiple
definitions of PAD as a CSP, and found the one that follows the most pleasing. However, this
mapping is certainly not the only one that is possible.
In PAD, the set of variables contains the positions in the schedule. If a PAD task contains 6
appointments (including the car option), the variables are positions 1 to 6. The values are the
appointments. The constraints are the time-windows (i.e. the ÒspaceÓ between earliest and
latest time) of the appointments.
                                                 
11 Of course, it is exactly this worst case that is crucial for the classification of a problem (or task) in terms of its
complexity (Sipser, 1997).
12 For purposes of readability I have decided to give an informal explanation in this text. However, this
explanation was created in exact analogy to Ginsberg (1993), where the interested reader can find the formal
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This last point carries the implication that the quality of the constraints is crucial to the easy or
hard nature of the particular instance of a problem. PAD is easy if the time to do the
appointments is constrained in such a way as to create a linear ordering among them. In that
case, the appointments can simply be met one after the other. PAD becomes harder the more
intersections exist between the time windows of the appointments, because in that case, it is
harder to choose among them, and the risk to choose the wrong appointment next is greater. If
the time window for all appointments is identical, the problem is hardest. At least, in the case
of PAD, the additional information about the duration of the appointments and the distances
between them can offer some more decision guidelines (it can be used as a substitute
constraint, in case the time information is not sufficient). However, if this additional
information does not support an unambiguous choice either, an irresolvable conflict arises,
and one or more appointments cannot be met.
Funke & Krger (1997, cited in Huchler, 1999, p. 82) have also commented on the difficulty
of PAD tasks as a function of the intersection between the appointments. They claim that the
difficulty of a PAD task is highest when the time windows of the appointments are largely
congruent, but the appointments themselves are not completely mutually exclusive.
This difficulty results from the fact that participants now have to search for the right solution
actively.
Niels Taatgen (personal conversation) has also pointed me to the fact that CSP are hardest
with an intermediate number of constraints, because the extreme cases of no constraints and
many constraints are trivial. In PAD, the notion of an Òintermediate number of constraintsÓ
corresponds to what could be called the Òintermediate discriminating valueÓ of the constraints.
There exist a number of heuristics for Constraint Satisfaction Problems that enhance
performance even in hard cases (Russell & Norvig, 1995, p.104). These heuristics use the
methods of Òforward checkingÓ and ÒbacktrackingÓ. The latter method analyzes the search
that has occurred until the current moment in order to avoid repeating states, and to keep track
of dead ends. The former method looks into the future in order to avoid states in which the
problems become unsolvable. I will discuss their applicability to PAD in section 3.6.x, which
examines possible weak methods for PAD.
In the light of the preceding discussion it is no surprise that the property that is associated
ith NP l t bl l th t th ti t l th i ti ll ith
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their size (i.e., in PAD, with the number of appointments) does not appear in the empirical
data that were obtained during studies that used PAD. In a study described in Funke & Krger
(1995, p.115), one group of participants had to solve PAD tasks 4 and 5, and another 13 and
14. The two latter tasks contain nine appointments each, The two former five and six
appointments. Despite this considerable difference in size, participants take on average the
same time for the ÒsmallerÓ and ÒlargerÓ tasks (616 and 699 sec for PAD 4/5, respectively and
755 and 568 sec for PAD 13/14 respectively). A similar pattern was observed for the number
of ÒoperationsÓ (i.e. movements to locations, car-use and deletions). Participants that had to
solve PAD 4 and PAD 5 used (on average) 16 and 17 actions, respectively. Participants who
solved PAD 13 and PAD 14 used 19 and 23 actions, respectively. While these findings are
moderated by the fact that there are multiple solutions to PAD 13 and 14 and only one for
PAD 4 and 5, the moderate difference between these two groups of tasks nevertheless speaks
a clear language. Moreover, PAD 4 and 5 also differ with respect to their size,13but hardly
with respect to the time and actions needed to solve them.
In the data I collected in the study described in chapter 4, a similar pattern emerges.
Participants took, on average 8 min. to solve PAD 4 and 9 min. to solve PAD 5. Moreover,
the total number of modifications that were produced by participants while they worked at
PAD4 was 325, and only 340 during the work on PAD 5. As 43 people participated in that
study, thatÕs less than one modification more (on average) per participant.
Other measures such as the number of deletions, and, consequently, the ratio of deletions to
actions, remain almost uncannily stable between the two tasks (the total number of deletions
is 655 is PAD 4 and 692 in PAD 5, the average ratio of deletions and actions is 0.32 in PAD 4
and 0.29 in PAD 5).
However, as mentioned before, all of this is not really surprising, as the NP-completeness
argument only holds for the worst case anyway. Moreover, as Hertzberg (1995) states, the fact
that humans do not show the exponential rise in required time, can either indicate that the
                                                 
13 Funke & Krger (1993, p. 6) show a way to compute the set of Òrational solutionsÓ for each PAD task. This is
equal to the combinations of all tasks, excluding visits to locations where no appointments are scheduled and
visits that place a later appointment before an earlier (more constrained) one. The number of rational solutions
for PAD 4 is 101, and for PAD 5, it is 388. This difference makes the ÒstabilityÓ of human scheduling behavior
even more compelling.
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Òworst caseÓ hasnÕt been met by a particular instance of the task, or that the underlying
mechanism in solving the task is different from the ÒclassicalÓ notion of planning (for more
on that notion, see the next section). We have already seen that the former is almost always
the case with PAD, so itÕs time to explore the latter.
3.2 A brief excursion to planning in AI
A brief comment must be made to justify my selection of theories to be examined in this
chapter, which could perhaps be called representative (although even that point is open to
discussion) but certainly by no means complete.
To explain this choice, I have to concern myself a little14 with the ideas of Òclassical
planningÓ, as it has dominated research in AI for a long time. Let me first review what is
meant by the term Òclassical planningÓ.
Planning as such is often described in AI as finding a sequence of actions that will yield a
specific goal. Russell & Norvig (1995) summarize: ÒPlanning agents use look-ahead to come
up with actions that will contribute to goal achievement.Ó(p.362). They are similar to problem
solving agents, but not entirely identical. As I will (in accordance with Schenck, 2001) argue
later in this chapter that PAD is closer to (general) problem solving than to (classical)
planning, it is worth to briefly highlight these differences here (taken from Russell & Norvig,
1995, pp. 338 — 341).
• A more open representation of states, goals and operators in form of sentences enables
planning agents to detect relation between states and actions
•  The planner can insert actions in to the plan when they are needed, while the problem
solving agent works with an incremental sequence starting with an initial state and
proceeding in one direction
•  Planners exploit the fact that most parts of the world are independent of another by
creating partial sub-plans that can be carried out separately and combined in the end; this
is a Òdivide and conquerÓ — strategy.
                                                 
14 For an extensive (and funny) overview on the field of planning in AI, which covers more recent as well as
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To enable artificial systems, i.e. algorithms and computing machines, to perform this task,
several constraints had to be established. These constraints constitute the frame of classical
planning. The ten most important of these constraints are (translated by Schenck, 2001;
originally from Hertzberg, 1995):
• There exists only one planner (planning actor)
• It is possible to represent the relevant parts of the world in states; these states are complete
snapshots of the world
• State transformations by planned actions are the only form in which time is represented
• Planning and plan execution are carried out one after another
• Complete information about the facts within the ÒworldÓ are available during planning as
well as during plan execution
• The effects of an action are deterministic and context-free. That means, they are identical
for every state in which the action is executable.
• During plan execution the world is only changed by the actions of the actor, who is guided
by the plan
• The objectives of the resulting plan are explicitly stated; they are consistent and can be
achieved by known actions.
It is easy to see that some of these constraints are violated in Òreal lifeÓ planning or
scheduling, e.g. the completeness of information, the non-interruptibility of the planner, and
the infinite amount of time. This problem has already been mentioned in the introduction.
This lack of (cognitive) plausibility does not constitute a problem in itself, as it is not the
objective of AI to accurately model human behavior —this is the aim of cognitive modeling.
AI uses specific features of human thought in order to develop algorithms that can solve a
wide range of task efficiently. Cognitive Modeling imitates, and AI creates, which is perfectly
legitimate15. However, ÒclassicalÓ planners also face problems within the domain of AI. These
problems usually stem form the intrinsically hard nature of some problems, as, e.g., PAD,
which causes an inflexible ÒclassicalÓ planner to use a lot of computation time.
Interestingly, some of these problems have been tackled by introducing mechanisms that are,
implicitly or explicitly, more cognitively plausible. For example, the planner STRIPS (Fikes
& Nilsson, 1971) is based on means-end analysis and adheres to the principles of classical
                                                 
15 Following this line of reasoning Newell & SimonÕ s (1972) work in the general problem solver (GPS) must be
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planning. While STRIPS provides us with a neat paradigm to code operators and states for a
given problem16, it faced some problems that, only one year later, resulted in the inclusion of
Macro-operators (Fikes & Nilsson, 1972). These Macro-operators test whether abstract plans
can apply to a new situation; i.e. a plan need not be created from scratch anytime a new
problem arises. This resembles a rudimentary memory system.  Other planners that behave
more human-like (a collection of them can be found in Akyrek, 1992) employ analogical
reasoning from examples, also a familiar feature of human problem solving (Anderson, 1983;
Anderson, 1987; Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998).
Other, more specific, improvements from the already mentioned field of Constraint
Satisfaction Search are also aimed at using memory more efficiently by establishing
sophisticated backtracking strategies that retain successful parts of the solution to the problem
at hand, modify only faulty parts, avoid redundant search, and favor local instead of global
modifications (Ginsberg, 1993). A related approach is the analysis of Òdead endsÓ that have
occurred in the problem-solving process, in order to avoid the same mistakes, in combination
with more or less sophisticated look-ahead methods (Dechter & Frost, 2002). These ideas
implement in effect a rudimentary learning mechanism. I will take them up again in
discussing AndersonÕs (1983, 1987) theory of skill acquisition.
The preceding paragraphs have been quite critical of classical planning, and give the
impression of portraying the Ògood influenceÓ of psychologically plausible constructs like
episodic memory or learning on the field of AI. It is, however, not the intention of this thesis
to refute one specific theory, or school of research. That would be trivial indeed, especially
given HertzbergÕ s (1995) statement, already cited in the introduction, that Òthere is no thing
as planning as suchÓ. Instead, it is worthwhile to ask: ÒTo what degree are these particular
ideas relevant for PAD?Ó This shall guide further analysis.
So, to what degree are the ideas of classical planning relevant for PAD?
Schenck (2001) interestingly points out that some of the constraints of classical planning are
met in the PAD world, e. g., there is only one planning actor, the PAD world can be
represented by states (of the ÒTerminplanerÓ) that are in themselves complete. There are no
                                                 
16 In STRIPS, states and operators are coded in terms of first order logic. The description of states contains the
difference to former states, and the description of operators contains the changes they can make to any given
combination (formula) of states. This is much more efficient than, e.g., an endless list of Òif...then...elseÓ
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Òhidden layersÓ or dynamics, which produce surprising outcomes: the constraint that during
plan-execution the world can only be changed by the actor holds, too. Although the effect of a
move to an appointment depends on the position of that appointment in the already existing
schedule (i.e. I can be too late if I go to the Conference after the caf but in time vice versa),
the effect itself is predictable. Given the same context, it remains always the same, meeting
the sixth constraint. Thus, PAD as a task can be classified in close proximity to classic
problem-solving tasks that can be solved by classic means, as, e.g. means-end analysis. PAD
is not a highly complex, dynamic and unpredictable real world scenario.
Schenck (2001) notices the following subtle distinction/ interaction between planning and
problem solving in the domain of PAD. PAD requires participants to schedule appointments,
i.e. find a sequence of operators, Òand this is clearly a planning problemÓ (Schenck, 2001,
p.28). However, the fact that participants can delete moves places PAD close to Problem-
Solving in a more general sense, Òwhere operators may be undone, and where the problem
solving process may go back and forth to every known state in the problem spaceÓ (p. 28 —
29). The PAD Interface also clearly evokes the incremental construction of a sequence of
operators (moves to appointments), starting from an initial state (Office). According to the
definition of a planning agent (Russell & Norvig, 1995) given above, this rather calls for a
simple problem-solving agent than one for planning.
The stages of plan-preparation and plan-execution are intermingled in PAD. This makes the
process more vulnerable to disruptions (trial and error behavior, bottom—up planning),
because ÒwrongÓ decisions have no direct harmful consequences.
A more severe Òno returnÓ scenario, in which time passes as in real life and cannot be
recovered would probably produce a slightly different, presumably more deliberate, kind of
behavior, and perhaps better plans as well. However, the value of PAD lies precisely in its
flexibility, which enables the researcher to witness the search-process that ultimately leads to
the complete schedule. By allowing for mistakes and modifications, PAD lends as much
transparency to the flow of human thinking as can be obtained without the use of verbal-
protocol analysis.
To sum it up, both the paradigm of classical planning and the paradigm of problem solving
prevail in the PAD world.
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However, the data mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (section 3.1), concerning the
latencies and the number of actions in different PAD-tasks suggest that humans must have
some method to avoid the dangers that have to be faced by classical planners. This was the
reason to introduce some psychologically motivated theories of planning and scheduling. The
former paragraphs on classical planning helps to justify my choice in this regard.
The three theoretical approaches I will now discuss are each prototypical of a specific element
of cognitive plausibility that was introduced into classical planning with the objective to
enhance its performance.
Firstly, the accounts of Altermann (1988) and Schank & Abelson (1977) use the concept of
episodic memory, remindful of the early modifications to STRIPS.
Secondly, there is the approach of Opportunistic planning, which emphasizes the fact that
planning can also occur in a Òbottom-upÓ-fashion, i.e. a plan can be changed throughout its
execution. This possibility arises out of PADÕs conceptual proximity to problem solving and
the reversibility of actions, as pointed out by Schenck (2001).
Thirdly, there is AndersonÕs (1983, 1987) theory of the learning of Cognitive Skills, which
can be connected to the mechanisms of Òsophisticated forward checkingÓ, which de facto
implement procedural learning throughout a problem solving session. This similarity is not
obvious yet; however, it will become more clear in the course of the section of this chapter
that is devoted to AndersonÕs (1983, 1987) theory.
I have already reported SchenckÕs (2001) assessment of the relevance of classical planning for
the PAD world. I will now attempt a similar assessment with regard to the three theories
mentioned above.
3.3 Memory, Scripts and Adaptive Planning: The ideas of Schank, Abelson and
Altermann
Hertzberg (1989) summarizes one often-heard critique of the concept of planning in AI in the
following statement ÒNo one plans the solution to every-day ÔproblemsÕ!Ó (p. 214). This is, to
a certain degree, true. It is hard to disagree with Hertzberg Õs elaboration of his statement: ÒIf
I am at home and discover that IÕm hungry, I donÕt sit down and make a plan that tells me
how I, by minimizing the product of time and path-length, may enter a state in which the
statement ÒIÕm fullÓ is TRUEÓ (p.214).
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According to the notion of Adaptive Planning, what we are likely to do instead is retrieve an
old plan which has worked in the same or a similar situation before (e.g., call the Pizza
Service). If we are in a situation that diverges from the situation in which he plan was
originally carried out, we modify the plan. If the situation is the same, we simply execute it
again.
The plan is checked with regard to its appropriateness for the current situation step by step. If
a divergence is found, the step is adapted, if no divergence is found, it is incorporated in the
current plan.
The crucial element here is the interpretation of the situation (Òsituation matchingÓ).
Altermann (1988) postulates three possible basic differences between planning steps. These
differences are interpreted with regard to the situation as such: different preconditions of the
planning steps, different outcomes, and different goal specifications.
The new plan is obtained by means of  ÒabstractingÓ from the old one. This means that
specific parts of that old plan have to be removed and changed, while the basic relations
between the steps remains intact. To retain these relations, it is necessary to postulate a kind
of background knowledge about situation. In Altermann (1988) this background knowledge
encompasses categorizational knowledge, which uses the ISA-relationship among concepts,
partonomic knowledge, causal knowledge and role knowledge. Causal knowledge in turn
contains five types of relations: purpose, reason, goal, precondition and outcome. This
network of knowledge is combined to make sure that the adaptation of an old plan and the
substitution of the planning steps are carried out correctly.
After the abstraction, a possible candidate from the same category (obtained by means of
abstraction) as the rejected planning step is selected and tested according to its applicability. If
this alternative can be accepted, the adaptation process continues with the next step. If it is
rejected, another candidate is selected.
Altermann (1988) distinguishes his approach from the superficially similar idea of case based
reasoning (Carbonell, 1981, 1983).
Carbonell has also used the idea to apply earlier plans to novel situations. In contrast to
Altermann, however, he emphasized the lack of abstract knowledge in many novel situations,
and instead proposed a use of old plans by means of analogy. He offered two different
approaches to implement this notion. In the first (1981) he transformed an old problem into a
new one, using means-ends analysis. In the second (1983), he proposes a mechanism called
Òd i ti l l Ó t t th d i i ki f th ld bl
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According to Altermann (1988), the main differences between his and CarbonellÕ s work are
the following:
Altermann (1988) assumes that the specific plan is used in order to create an appropriate one
for the current situation, with the more abstract plans serving as Òbackup strategyÓ in case the
specific plan is partially inappropriate. In contrast, Carbonell (1981, 1983) assumes that
specific plans serve the role of Òbackup strategiesÓ in case no abstract plan is available.
Furthermore, the process of ÒrefittingÓ the old plans differs: For Altermann (1988), the
process of situation matching is crucial, which depends on specific declarative knowledge
about these self-same situations, while Carbonell (1981, 1983) employs more traditional weak
methods like analogy and means-ends analysis.
This, the third difference, according to Altermann (1988), lies in the character and use of
background knowledge. CarbonellÕ s Òderivational historyÓ (1983) contains a decision making
process, while background knowledge sensu Altermann denotes Òthe relationships between
the prestored plan and the other pieces of knowledge that are related to itÓ (p. 418).
Altermann (1988) states that ÒAdaptive Planning is in the spirit of recent work in artificial
intelligence on modeling (!) human memory (e.g. Schank, 1982)Ó (p.418). This may be a good
moment to briefly review the script theory by Schank & Abelson (1977).
Schank & Abelson (1977) focused on the understanding, rather than the construction of plans.
They assume that human memory is build around episodes rather than being organized in an
abstract semantic network. Two basic concepts in this understanding of human memory are
the script and the scheme. The latter contains general knowledge that can be applied in
specific situations, if they are exemplary of the scheme. The former denotes a stereotypical
sequence of events which is likely to be required in a specific situation (the well known
textbook-example of the restaurant script needs no elaboration here). The script is active in a
ÒvariabilizedÓ form and can be instantiated according to the specific situation. However,
Schank & Abelson (1977) emphasize that the scripts are relatively constrained: ÒA script is
made of slots and requirements about what can fill these slotsÓ (p. 41). This is remindful of
AltermannÕ s (1988) abstraction mechanism.
Schank & Abelson (1977) state that scripts and schemes Ò(do not) provide the apparatus for
handling totally new situationsÓ (p.41). That carries the following consequence: A person can
only understand a situation in which they have been before, or, more generally, which they
have encountered before. This knowledge helps them to interpret things.
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According to Schank & Abelson (1977) it is only in dealing with completely novel situations
that humans recur to planning at all. Their definition of a plan is similar to the definitions
from AI literature cited above. They conceptualize a plan as a sequence of actions that is
aimed at reaching a goal (or multiple goals). Plans contain knowledge about relations between
events and about actions that can connect events with each other. This is remindful of
standard definitions of problem solving, and Schank & Abelson (1977) indeed classify the
construction of a new plan as problem - solving, as opposed to the mere retrieval of the
appropriate script.
As in Altermann (1988), this Òbackground knowledgeÓ is more abstract than the specific
knowledge (old plans or scripts respectively), and is only evoked if none of the latter is
available. Schank & Abelson view scripts as specific instantiations of plans. Both Altermann
(1988) and Schank & Abelson (1977) seem to regard planning as a kind of Òbackup strategyÓ,
which has to be employed if the more convenient retrieval doesnÕt work, either for lack of
previous knowledge, or because the previous knowledge is not appropriate anymore because
the situation has changed.
3.4 Opportunistic Planning
The work of Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) on opportunistic planning is an early example
of cognitive modeling, because the authors implement their model as a computer simulation,
the ÒbehaviorÓ (i.e. output trace) of which they subsequently compare with human behavior.
Although Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) also want to show the efficacy and functionality
of opportunistic planning per se, the main objective of their work is the analysis and accurate
modeling of human planning.
In order to assess human planning, Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) use the ÒA dayÕ s
errandsÓ task (subsequently abbreviated ADE), which resembles PAD, as the name already
suggests. As in PAD, participants who work with the ADE have to schedule various
appointments for a day. Participants also work with a map that shows a fictitious city. There
are some notable differences between the tasks, however. For example, the time-constraints in
the ADE arenÕt as rigid as in PAD. For some appointments a duration and a latest possible
time is mentioned, but not for all. There are no priorities mentioned, and, more importantly,
the distances between the locations arenÕt given. Thus, participants do not obtain a feedback
in the case of being too late, because Òtoo lateÓ is not defined formally. Another difference
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PAD 5, Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) designed ADE in a way that was supposed to make
it impossible to meet each of the (many) appointments.
These differences between the tasks are important for the subsequent evaluation of the
relevance of Hayes-Roth & Hayes-RothÕ s (1979) model of planning for scheduling in the
PAD world and will be revisited later.
Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) assume that the structure underlying planning is organized
as a blackboard, which is, in turn, divided into five planes. They are called ÒMeta-PlanÓ,
ÒPlanÓ, ÒAbstractionÓ, ÒExecutionÓ and ÒKnowledge BaseÓ. Each of these planes contains
various levels of abstraction, i.e. with regard to how close they are to the actual execution of a
step in the planning process. For example, the highest level of abstraction on the Knowledge-
Base-Plane is ÒerrandsÓ, followed by ÒlayoutÓ and ÒneighborsÓ (i.e. errands that are close to
each other), with ÒroutesÓ (between the errands) being the least abstract level.
Planning is described as the result of various planning ÒspecialistsÓ communicating with each
other on the blackboard. The ÒspecialistsÓ each implement possible steps of planning, e.g. a
step to a specific location, or, on a more abstract level, the adherence to a specific criterion in
selecting the next appointments. The ÒspecialistsÓ are independent of each other. They are
implemented in the form of production rules that are divided in a condition and an action part.
The planning process proceeds in cycles. In each cycle, all specialists whose conditions are
matched by the current state propose their actions to be incorporated into the plan17. The
actions of the specialists are not coordinated systematically. Instead, the specialists behave
opportunistically by indiscriminately offering themselves for use. One specialist is selected,
and a new cycle begins. The planning process stops when a good plan (either according to an
external criterion or to the planner) has been developed, or, alternatively, when failure cannot
be denied any longer.
The decisions of the specialists are noted on the blackboard, and subsequent specialists match
their conditions against these entries.
The specialists are associated with specific planes and levels of the blackboard, and they only
have to take the entries already made on these specific places into account when they execute
their actions.
                                                 
17 This idea has appeared in some more recent production system architectures, which claim to be inspired by
neural parallelism, e.g. Soar (in which the production rules whose conditions are matched fire in parallel)
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Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) emphasize the special features of their model:
Because all (matching) specialists from all levels are allowed to propose themselves in each
cycle, their model can account for bottom up as well as top down processes in planning. An
example for the interplay between these two could be the following situation: The participant
has decided to focus on a specific area of the town, because he has discovered that many
errands have to be performed in that area. Thus, heading there will enable him to do many
errands in quick succession. Up until now, his planning has been strictly top-down: a general
strategy has been established which is now carried out in practice.
However, the following situation can occur during the execution of the plan that has been
created this way: The participant suddenly discovered that another location, which hadnÕt
figured in the previous plan, is situated close to his current location (e.g. the cafe across the
street). Spontaneously, he decides to go there and Òtake it inÓ on the way. After that, he can
either resume the original plan or abandon it completely in favor of a new approach that has
been triggered by the interruption.
This last bit of planning (the sudden realization: ÒOh! I can do that errand too, while IÕm on
the wayÓ) is certainly a bottom-up driven process (a specific percept changes —perhaps! - the
more abstract strategy).
Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) claim that their model is flexible enough to handle
complex tasks, and, due to its opportunistic structure, avoids the situation of getting stuck.
They also present an implementation of their model as Interlisp-Simulation and compare its
output with the verbal protocol that was produced by a participant working on the ADE task.
They conclude that the general fit between the planning process that is produced by the model
and the planning process that can be deduced from the utterances of the participant is
sufficient enough to confirm their assumptions about opportunistic planning.
They furthermore state that the relative amount of ÒspontaneousÓ bottom-up driven behavior
and more deliberate top-down driven reasoning depends on the specific circumstances of the
task, or on the demand of the real-life situation.
This last point offers itself (quite opportunistically) to initiate an assessment of the above-
described theories to scheduling in the PAD world.
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3.5 Adaptive and Opportunistic planning in the PAD world: An assessment
The theories of Adaptive18 and Opportunistic Planning appear to be widely apart. Adaptive
planning focuses on the organization of knowledge and its importance for coping with novel
situations. Opportunistic Planning describes the phenomenon of bi-directional processing
during plan-execution and uses it to explain interruptibility and erratic behavior in humans.
While the content and organization of episodic memory and background knowledge are
absolutely essential for Adaptive Planning, it is featured only slightly mysteriously in Hayes-
Roth & Hayes-RothÕ s (1979) description of Opportunistic Planning (memory is featured as
entries on the blackboard, left there by previously employed specialists). On the other hand,
while the interruption of the plan execution is part of the opportunistic model, it is not
mentioned at all in AltermannÕ s (1988) account.
What the two models have in common, however, is a slightly negative view of planning.
While Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) repeatedly stress the interruptibility of any, even
good plans, and the plan itself as the quite random product of the chaotic competitions of
unconnected demons (that have to be coordinated by the Homunculus of the central
executive), Altermann (1988) and Schank & Abelson (1977) view the generation of new plans
as a second-best strategy that only applies if retrieval (from memory) fails.
Both theories offer interesting ideas for a deeper task analysis of PAD. Let me start with
Opportunistic Planning.
3.5.1 Opportunistic Planning in PAD
It has already been pointed out that, due to the design of PAD, the stages of plan execution
and planning itself are intermingled in the PAD world. This makes the process vulnerable to
interruptions as they are reported in the work of Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979).
This becomes even clearer when we (re-) consider the design of the PAD interface. The map-
like arrangement of the locations makes it plausible that participants discover Òall of a
suddenÓ that they are close to an appointment that was not part of the original plan, but is so
conveniently situated that it can be done anyway. The PAD interface also enables the
                                                 
18 For the sake of verbal elegance I will use the term ÒAdaptive PlanningÓ to denote both Altermann’ s (1988)
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participants to easily include these appointments in their schedules, either by just attaching it
to the end or by modifying the already existing schedule.
This, however, already points to a divergence between the PAD world and the ADE world.
Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) report multiple examples in which their participant
completely abandons a strategy, seemingly forgetting about it, and continues his plan
ÒelsewhereÓ, i.e. at another location or level of abstraction. While these shifts of reasoning are
certainly in accordance with the notions of Opportunistic Planning, they are also supported by
the special situation the participant was placed in. The participant did not have to carry out his
plan, but instead had to describe what he would do with the errands he was assigned, looking
on the map. He was not given a feedback on the quality of his plan, either. This resulted in
him producing a plan that, amazingly, enabled him to do all errands on the list (which was
constructed with the purpose of evoking an errand-overload!). Finally, he also wasnÕt allowed
any means to remember his partial plans during planning.
In PAD, however, participants obtain immediate feedback in case they are too late. They can
also inspect their current schedule at any time.
It is obvious that the specific setting of the ADE task in Hayes-Roth & Hayes-RothÕ s (1979)
study is more likely to evoke the ÒchaoticÓ behavior the authors describe as opportunistic.
This behavior is probably connected to the fact that the participant wasnÕt able to correctly
remember the partial plans he had already formed, and the lack of constraints he was faced
with. Assuming that the Hayes-Rothian specialists do indeed exist, they were certainly given
full play in their study.
On the other hand, life in the PAD world is much more constrained. This should result in a
smaller amount of truly ÒopportunisticÓ behavior, due to the fact that the time constraints for
each appointment, and all distances between them, are continuously available to the
participants. Furthermore, due to the presence of the ÒTerminplanerÓ, modifications can be
made much more precisely (plans need not be abandoned completely), and the consequences
of modification are immediately obvious (as the modifications have to be entered into the
computer, which also elicits direct feedback).
Although the above paragraph shows some critical aspects of Hayes-Roth & Hayes-RothÕ s
(1979) work, they do not necessarily imply that their notion of Opportunistic Planning is
completely mistaken. On the contrary, the close connection between planning and plan
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spontaneous modifications. However, chances are that they will be a lot less ÒviolentÓ than in
those reported by Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979) (who, after all, have already stated that
the amount of bottom-up planning is likely to vary with the characteristics of the situation at
hand).
Let us now leave these slightly fuzzy theoretical speculations behind in favor of more specific
speculations. Given the characteristics of the Log-files described in chapter 2, what patterns
could be indicators for the presence of opportunistic planning in the PAD world?
This question is hard to answer. Nevertheless, the following attempt can be made.
In principle, every modification to a schedule can be the result of an opportunistic demon
piping in with an alternative move. However, modifications can also be the result of sloppy
calculations and subsequent ÒimpossibilityÓ -feedback of the system.
Similarly, restarts can be the result of spontaneous opportunistic intrusion, but it can also
occur after a series of systematic, yet unsuccessful, modifications to a schedule.
I therefore tentatively propose that the following patterns in the scheduling process could be
called ÒopportunisticÓ:
•  Many modifications can be a sign for opportunistic planning, especially if they occur
ÒspontaneouslyÓ (i.e. they are not prompted by the system).
• Many restarts can be a sign of opportunistic processes, especially if they occur with only
few ÒlocalÓ modifications (to the end of schedules) in between (a short Òlongest-
modification-phaseÓ)
• Another indicator for processes of opportunistic planning could be a high variety of the
schedules.
Yet another indicator could be the length of the partial schedules: If a participant consistently
produces short schedules, this could indicate opportunistic processes, or at least a certain
readiness to modify the schedule quickly. This pattern of behavior would be consistent with a
high variety in modifications and many spontaneous restarts.
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All of this is, however, still quite speculative. It would certainly not be legitimate to analyze
empirical data, search for the features sketched in the paragraph above, and conclude (if they
are found): ÒHayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth were right after allÓ.
This would be unwarranted for various reasons.
Firstly, the inter-individual differences in complex tasks (and PAD is complex) are usually
high, so it is unlikely that one pattern of behavior will be exhibited by all participants.
Secondly, empirical data only record overt behavior and not the underlying processes. We can
therefore only analyze patterns and describe patterns. It is possible to describe an
Òopportunistic patternÓ, which refers to a pattern of behavior that would be consistent with the
notion of Opportunistic Planning — but could also be the result of different processes, as we
shall see in the next paragraph.
However, without verbal protocols, we may not state that the processes underlying these
patterns are indeed identical to the processes postulated by the adepts of Opportunistic or
Adaptive (or another optional attribute) Planning.
This should be kept in mind throughout the remainder of this chapter, as well as in the next
chapter, which features an analysis of  the patterns of modifications found in human data, and,
naturally, a review of  the interpretations offered in this chapter.
3.5.2 Adaptive Planning in PAD? No, but exploration
Instinctively, the notion of Adaptive Planning seems to be out of place in the PAD world, and
even at second glance this assessment holds true.
It is obvious that a PAD task cannot be solved by invoking memories from our past and
matching them to the current situation. In the ADE task used in the work of Hayes-Roth &
Hayes-Roth (1979), this is to a certain degree possible. The verbal protocol produced by the
participant in Hayes-Roth & Hayes-RothÕ s (1979) study contains several statements that
involve prior knowledge about the world and about the compatibility of errands, etc. E.g., he
states that he wants do the groceries as late as possible, because otherwise the milk will go
bad (pp. 278 - 279). The participant also assigns primary and secondary importance to the
individual errands himself, according to his subjective views and presumably also based on
his experiences. E.g. he decides that the errand to obtain medicine for the dog at the vet is
Òdefinitely a primaryÓ, although it does not say so in the instructions (p. 278).
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The PAD world is a much more rigid place. Everything is pre-defined, from the times the
appointments can be met to their priorities and the distances between them. Although he
appointments themselves are realistic enough (who doesnÕt know the feeling of copying a
book for one hour and a half?) the constraints of the task are rigid enough to evoke problem-
solving behavior Òfrom scratchÓ. Participants have to find the schedule for a PAD task on
their own, they canÕt simply retrieve it. Remember that for Altermann (1988) as well as for
Schank & Abelson (1977) planning is problems solving; it is employed only if no script or
previous plan for a situation is available. Viewed this way, the PAD world is a strenuous
Òworst caseÓ for the participants, and so it should be - after all, one of its objectives is to
measure planning and scheduling abilities, not memory capacity and swiftness of analogical
reasoning.
Although Adaptive Planning canÕt be applied in the PAD world, it is worthwhile to discuss a
close relative here: declarative learning. Declarative learning in the PAD world can occur in
the form of accumulating knowledge about the feasibility of partial schedule. This notion is
close to LoganÕ s (1988) theory of instance based learning, which states that problem solving
is the result of the interpretation and exploitation of specific problem solving episodes.
While participants canÕt apply old experiences in order to solve a PAD task, they nevertheless
gather new experiences during the solution of the task. In the course of their scheduling
attempts, they find out which combinations of appointments are feasible and which are not.
These experiences are certainly useful, because they help avoiding redundant states.
They also enable the participants to refrain from pre-calculating the possibility of moving to
an appointment each time they have made a choice, because they already know for sure that
certain partial schedules do work. This is a considerable relief for working memory, because
the calculations involved in choosing an appointment in PAD can be quite straining, as we
shall see in section x.
However, in the PAD world this kind of declarative learning comes at a cost. In order to learn
about the feasibility of partial schedules, participants have to accumulate them. This means
that some amount of schedule-modification is a prerequisite to declarative learning. These
modifications can either happen because the participant has made a mistake (and is being told
so by the system), or because the participant deliberately abandons partial schedules, before
ti f db k
How humans solve scheduling problems
In the first case, the knowledge that is accumulated is ÒnegativeÓ knowledge: Participants
know how the solution wonÕt look. This is useful knowledge, as the feedback of the system is
always accurate. The schedules ÒlearnedÓ this way can be ruled out in future considerations
and have not to be taken up again.
In the second case, the situation is more ambiguous. Should the participant take up schedules
again, which he has already tried earlier, and abandoned?
On the one hand, the participant knows that a schedule works until the point at which he has
abandoned it. That speaks in favor of trying it again. However, that is no guarantee that it will
really work out. In fact, it was probably abandoned because it seemed to be unpromising.
Given the necessity to accumulate experience on the one hand, and the limitations of working
memory19 and time on the other hand, participants are faced two difficult decisions: ÒHow
often should I modify a schedule before a restartÓ, and, later Òshould I take that schedule up
again, or notÓ. This of course prompts back to the introduction, where it was nonchalantly
stated that, in the context of modifications, Òmoderation is the keyÓ. This statement is
certainly true, and it certainly shows that there is no certain rule as to the amount of
modification that is most supportive of optimal declarative learning.
A factor that determines the amount of modifications to a single schedule could be the
presence of other appointments that look promising at the start of a schedule. If there are
many, it is less risky to abandon a particular schedule; if there are few, more modifications of
a schedule starting with a specific appointments can be expected.
A factor that determines the re-uptake of schedules starting with a specific appointment can
be the reason why this schedule has been abandoned in the first place. If it was abandoned
because the participant wanted to try something else, there is no reason to not try it again.
However, if it was abandoned because the participant saw, looking ahead, that this schedule
canÕt work (because it renders another appointment impossible), it is not reasonable to take it
up again. Of course, the correctness of the look-ahead is crucial here.
ThatÕs why some participants may find it useful to use PAD as a helpful device, which
enables them to test certain schedules (instead of simulating them mentally). Others may find
this aversive.
                                                 
19 It is perhaps useful to point back to the number of Òrational solutionsÓ that was computed by Funke & Krger
(1993, p.6), which was 101 for PAD 4 and 388 for PAD 5. This gives a good impression of the scope of
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This last point adds an interesting facet to the description of the Òopportunistic patternÓ made
in the previous paragraph. The presence of many modifications, a high variety and many
restarts may not only be viewed as an indicator of opportunistic processes. It can also be the
result of a deliberate strategy of the participant: The strategy to (simply) explore the space of
possible schedules directly by inputting them to the system, and to avoid extensive forward
search or mental arithmetic.
This is an example of the ambiguity of patterns like this, and the resulting impossibility to
definitely define the underlying process. For the remainder of the thesis I will therefore call
this specific pattern the explorative pattern, which includes deliberate as well as spontaneous
exploration. A summary explanation of the explorative pattern is given in figure 3.1. An
example Log file (imaginary) displaying an explorative pattern is shown in figure 3.2.
Explorative Pattern:
Many modifications
Many Restarts
High Variety
Short Modifications
Figure 3.1:  Summary of the explorative pattern
 (Appointments to be scheduled: Cafe, Secretary, Conference, Storehouse, and Post Office)
• (Storehouse Secretary)
• (Storehouse Conference)
• (Conference)
• (Secretary Conference Storehouse)
• (Secretary Cafe)
• (Cafe)
• (Post Office Cafe)
Number of scheduled appointments: 5
Variety: 5
Restarts: 4
Average modification length: 2
Number of modifications: 7
Figure 3.2:  Example Log File showing an explorative pattern
After this discussion of declarative learning in the domain of PAD, I will now describe a
procedural view of skill acquisition. I will show where procedural learning can take place in
PAD and, afterwards, show the connection of declarative and procedural learning processes in
the PAD world.
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3.6 ACT*: A procedural view of skill acquisition
In this section, I will discuss AndersonÕ s (1987) theory of skill acquisition. This theory is part
of AndersonÕ s ACT* architecture (1983), a unified theory of cognitive performance, and as
such must adhere to its constraints. However, as only the concept of skill acquisition is of
immediate relevance to the present thesis, I will focus my discussion on that aspect.
AndersonÕ s theory of skill acquisition (1987) was devised with the objective to Òaccount for
differences in behavior by differences in experienceÓ (p. 192). He claims that learning
theories place an important and necessary constraint on models of cognitive skills, namely,
that these accounts have to include plausible mechanisms that make this skill learnable at all.
Anderson (1987) gives an extraordinarily concise overview of his theory in his abstract,
which I will therefore partly quote:
Cognitive Skills are encoded by a set of productions, which are organized according to
a hierarchical goal structure. People solve problems in new domains by applying weak
problem solving procedures to declarative knowledge they have about this domain.
From these initial problem solutions, production rules are compiled that are specific to
that domain and that use of the knowledge (p. 192).
An example of the application of a weak method to a new domain (paraphrased from
Anderson, 1987, pp. 194 — 195) is the case of a novice subject, B. R., who learned to code
function definitions in Lisp. In order to achieve this, she was provided with an introductory
text on function definitions in Lisp, a specific example, and a template of such a function
definition, which showed the general syntax, but left open spaces for the specific elements
(see figure 3.1.).
Template Example
(defun <function name>
(<parameter1><parameter2>...)
<process description>)
(defun t-to-c (temp)
(quotient (difference temp 32) 1.8))
Figure 3.3:  The template and the example for coding Lisp-functions, as reported in Anderson (1987). The
function ÒF-to-CÓ converts temperatures in Fahrenheit into centigrade.
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B. R. used the weak method of analogy to solve that problem; i.e. she mapped her own
function on the template, using the example.
This mapping involves multiple steps, between which the example function is inspected as a
guideline. Accordingly, the first coding of a Lisp function takes some time20.
However, Anderson (1987) reports an impressive speedup between the first and the second
coding-trial21, despite the fact that the second trial involved a more complex function (p.195).
He explains this with a process called Òrule compilationÓ.
ÒRule compilationÓ means the creation of new production rules that perform the steps that had
to be established individually during the first trial in a single sequence. In the Lisp-context,
that means that the example functions donÕt need to be inspected as often anymore. The weak
method has changed into a task specific strategy.
This notion leads to an interesting prediction. Apart from the speedup between the first and
second trial in learning experiments, it can also be predicted that there will be positive transfer
between tasks that are structurally similar (i.e., in AndersonÕ s (1983) terminology, that have
identical or similar goal structures), but no positive transfer between tasks that use the same
declarative knowledge, but are structurally different22. The more similar two tasks are, the
more transfer can be expected. Thus, cognitive skills are extremely task specific. He presents
impressive empirical evidence that supports this prediction, from superficially different areas
as text - editing, the development of geometric and mathematical proofs, and (once more)
Lisp programming. A detailed account of this evidence is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of
the present thesis. I will, however, briefly report an example from Lisp-programming.
Anderson (1987, p. 201) reports a study in which participants had to learn to evaluate Lisp-
expressions, i. e. they were presented with the expression and had to predict to what value that
expression would evaluate. As could be expected, participants got gradually better at doing
this: they were faster in answering and they made fewer errors. In between these evaluation
trials, participants were occasionally presented with the task to code Lisp-functions that would
produce a specific output. This task uses the same declarative knowledge as the evaluation
                                                 
20 I can confirm this.
21 Using data that were obtained with the CMU Lisp tutor.
22 Anderson (1987) acknowledges that it is problematic to specify the productions (the ÒstructureÓ) that underlie
two tasks, as Òthere is always the danger of fashioning production system models to fit the observed degree of
transferÓ (p. 198). He advises to consult different sources of independent evidence for specific productions, and,
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task, as Anderson (1987, p. 202) shows. However, performance in the coding exercise did not
improve with time.
3.7 Transfer in the PAD world: An exploration of two specific PAD tasks
In the following paragraphs, I will first compare the necessary steps to solve two specific
PAD tasks, PAD 4 and PAD 5, in order to analyze the possibility of Transfer between these
two tasks. While transfer on the level of the appointmentsÕ criteria (ÒMacro levelÓ) is
unlikely, on a lower (ÒmicroÓ) level, compilation of the mathematical steps involved in
forward checking from Constraint Satisfaction Search can occur in PAD.
3.7.1 Criteria of the appointments
We have already seen in the previous section that the method of adapting old plans to the
current situation is not applicable in the PAD world. A similar thing is true for the analogy
method mentioned in Anderson (1987). In the PAD world, participants are (usually) not
presented with somebody elseÕ s solution and then left with the option to try to solve their
own task analogously.
But what about drawing analogies between two PAD tasks - in short, transfer? If I have found
a good solution to the first of the two PAD tasks, can I use my knowledge about this solution
to help me in the second task? I will address that question using PAD 4 and PAD 5, the tasks
that were already introduced in chapter 2.
This may be a good moment to review the appointments for PAD 4 and PAD 5.
The figure shown below is identical to the figure in chapter 2. However, the solutions are
added to the figure, as they will be referred to multiple times in the following discussion.
PAD 4
Solution: (Administration-car-Storehouse-Conference-Secretary-Printing Office)
• You have to be at the Storehouse between 10.00 a.m and 0.15 p.m. It will take you 10 minutes. ItÕs
important.
• Between 11.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m you have to visit the Secretary. It will take you 10 minutes.
•  You have to be at the Conference at 1.00 p.m, in the latest case. The Conference will last until
2.00 p.m. ItÕs very important.
•  You have to be at the Administration building at 2.30 p.m. It will last 90 minutes. ItÕs very
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• Between 10.00 and 4.00 p.m., you have to be at the Printing Office. This will take you 90 minutes.
ItÕs very important.
PAD 5
(Solution: Printing Office-Conference-car-Office-Cafe-Central Office-Administration)
• Between 1.30 p.m and 2.30 p.m., you can meet a customer at the cafeteria. The talk will last 30
minutes. ItÕs important.
• Between 11.00 a.m. and 2.00 p.m you have to show up at the Office and deal with the files there.
You will need 60 minutes for this. ItÕs very important.
• You have to be at the Conference at 11.30 a.m, in the latest case. The Conference will last until
0.15 p.m. ItÕs important.
• Between 10.00 a.m. and 4.15 p.m. you have to meet your boss at the Central Office. He wants to
see you for 10 minutes. ItÕs very important.
• Between 10.00 a.m. and 4.00 p.m., you have to be at the Administration. The work there will take
55 minutes. ItÕs important.
• Between 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. you are to come to the Printing Office and copy a book. This
will take 10 minutes
Figure 3.4. Appointments in PAD 4 and PAD 5, with solutions. There is only one complete solution in each PAD
task.
One difference between the two tasks becomes obvious almost immediately: Although PAD 4
and PAD 5 ÒshareÓ three appointments (the Conference, the Printing Office and the
Administration), the times associated with the appointments paint a different picture for each
of the two tasks. In PAD 5, the appointments all take place at similar times; in PAD 4, the
times assigned to the appointments are rather different.
Consider, e. g., the appointments that start at 10 a.m. In PAD 4, these are the Storehouse, the
Administration, and the Printing Office. The latest time to meet these appointments are 0.15
p.m. (Storehouse), 2.30 p.m. (Administration), and 4 p.m. (Printing Office).
In PAD 5, these appointments are the Central Office, the Administration, and the Printing
Office. Their latest possible times are 4.15 p.m (Central Office), 4 p.m. (Administration) and
3 p.m. (Printing Office).
In PAD 4, the following linear sequence is suggested by the latest possible times, or urgency,
of the appointments:
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Storehouse, Conference, Administration, Printing Office,
Secretary.
 On the one hand, this is nice, because it makes that particular task easier to solve, as the times
restrict the choice of appointments for each slot in the schedule. For example, it is obvious
that the Storehouse-appointment must be scheduled for an early time, and the appointments at
the Printing Office and the Secretary can take place later.
However, this ordering can also be an obstacle in finding the solution. The crucial step in
PAD 4 is to place the Administration before the Storehouse and take the car to the latter
appointment. It can be difficult to see this, because it is not explicitly mentioned that the
earliest possible time to meet the appointment at the Administration is 10 a.m. Instead, it says
in the instruction: ÒYou have to be at the Administration building at 2.30 p.m.Ó. This is an
ambiguous statement in English, and even more so in German. It can both be interpreted as
ÒYou must be there precisely at a specific timeÓ, and as Òyou have to be there at that time in
the latest caseÓ.
The travel to the Storehouse by car is also risky; if the distance between Administration and
Storehouse is reduced to a third, the participant is just in time. It is probable that participants
calculate this in advance, but only sloppily, and thus arrive at the mistaken conclusion that a
schedule that places the appointment at the Administration first wont work, as they will be too
late for the Storehouse.
As already mentioned, there is more intersection between the appointments in PAD 5. This
brings back to mind the remarks about constraints made earlier in this chapter. There it was
said that a PAD task is most difficult for an intermediate Òdiscriminating valueÓ of the
appointmentsÕ time-constraints. The most difficult case occurs if the appointments have
identical time constraints but are, due to their duration and the distances between them, not
mutually exclusive. In that case, participants can do nothing but search. PAD 5 is definitely
closer to that ÒproblematicÓ situation than PAD 4.
The crucial steps for finding the complete solution for PAD 5 are also different from PAD 4.
The complete solution for PAD 5 is:
Printing Office, Conference, car, Office, Cafe, Central
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 The Printing Office is located far away from the starting point (the Office), and it is the sole
appointment that is assigned no priority. Furthermore, it has ÒcompetitionÓ from the
Conference room, which is located next to it (Figure 2.1. or Appendix 1 can be consulted for a
view of the PAD world). While in PAD 4, the information about the ÒurgencyÓ of the
appointment at the Storehouse has to be overcome in order to arrive at the correct solution, in
PAD 5, the information that has to be ÒignoredÓ concerns the Printing OfficeÕ s low priority.
This points to some interesting similarities between the two PAD tasks. While they are
perhaps not poignant enough to allow for a direct analogy, they nevertheless deserve
highlighting here.
Firstly, both in PAD 4 and PAD 5, a relatively unlikely appointment has to be placed at the
beginning of the schedule. Both the Administration (PAD 4) and the Printing Office (PAD 5)
can be done until a relatively late time. Furthermore, in the case of the Administration, the
earliest possible time isnÕt mentioned, and in the case of the Printing Office, the priority is
low.
Secondly, in both cases exists an urgent alternative, which must be placed at the second
position in the schedule, as it canÕt be met later. This is the Storehouse in PAD 4 and the
Conference in PAD 5. However, as the Conference is a fixed appointment and can be visited
at 11 a.m. in the earliest case, the situation is somewhat different.
Thirdly, in both PAD 4 and PAD 5, the remainder of the schedule can be found relatively
easily after the difficult first choices have been made by linear chaining. We have already
seen that in PAD 4. In PAD 5, when the Printing Office and the Conference are placed at the
beginning of the schedule, the remaining appointments, ordered according to their urgency,
are
Office, Cafe, Administration, Central Office.
Apart from the (basically trivial) permutation of the last two appointments (remember that
such changes to the end of a schedule are supported by the PAD Interface), this sequence is
exactly the solution.
The following two tables (table 3.1 and table 3.2) give an overview of the solutions for PAD 4
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the current state of the schedule. (For example, in PAD 4, at solution step one, the
Administration has to be chosen, which ranks highest according to the criteria start time and
priority). The ÒcompetitorsÓ (appointments that also rank highest according to that criterion)
are placed in parentheses.
Table 3.1. The solution to PAD 4 (leftmost column) and their ranking according to the given criteria. The
appointments in parenthesis are appointments that also rank highest to the criterion at that point in the
scheduling process. Trivially, the last appointment (Printing Office) has no competitors.
Criteria
Start time urgency priority duration
Administration 1
(Storehouse,
Printing Office)
3 1
(Conference,
Printing Office)
3
Storehouse 1
(Printing Office)
1 2 1
(Secretary)
Conference 2 1 1
(Printing Office)
2
Secretary 2 1/2 2 1
Printing Office 1 1 1 1
Table 3.2. can be read analogous to table 3.1. The solution to PAD 5 is set in the leftmost column.
Criteria
Start time urgency priority duration
Printing Office 1
(Central Office,
Administration)
4 3 1
Conference 2 1 2
(Cafe,
Administration)
3
Office 2 1 1
(Central Office)
3
Cafe 2 1 2 2
How humans solve scheduling problems
(Administration)
Administration 1
(Central Office)
1 2 2
Central Office 1 1 1 1
Some information in the tables is remindful of the critical remarks about the heuristic-analysis
that is implemented in the PAD System (see chapter 2). In the same solution step, the same
heuristic favors different appointments; e.g., in the first solution step the Storehouse, the
Printing Office and the administration are ranked highest according to the criterion start time
in PAD 4. The same appointment ranks highest according to different heuristics. This again
shows the insufficiency of the overt criteria of the appointments as choice guidelines, and the
difficulty to interpret the choice of an appointment as evidence for a heuristic that adheres to a
specific criterion.
More importantly, tables 3.1 and 3.2 once more show that, after the ÒdifficultÓ first choice of
the first appointment (Administration or Printing Office), the criterion ÒurgencyÓ allows one
to find the solution. The appointment that has to be placed next in the schedule is always the
most urgent one (without competitors). However, as we shall see in the next chapter, people
do not seem to see that! They produce many modifications to a schedule, which makes it
unlikely that they systematically attend to the urgency criterion (in that case, they would
arrive at the solution much earlier).
In this context, I briefly (despite my fear of becoming redundant) want to comment once more
on the work of Wolfram Schenck (2001), who has also discovered that implementing the
choice of the next appointment in PAD as function of its overt characteristics is problematic.
In his thesis, Schenck (2001) discovered that his model of PAD, which he called EVA (for
ÒEvaluation of ActionsÓ) had no difficulty fitting human performance in PAD 4, whereas the
fir obtained for PAD 5 was mediocre (p. 91). In fact, a different parameter configuration had
to be chosen for the two tasks, in order to fit them both sufficiently (pp. 86-87).
Schenck himself explains this Òfailure of EVA on Pad Task 5Ó (as he calls it somewhat
exaggeratedly on p. 91) by referring to the necessity to place the appointment at the printing
office at the beginning of a schedule in order to find the solution to PAD 5:
Obviously the appointment at the Printing Office lacks some of the characteristics that
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all scheduled appointments). Second, in regards to the earliest task starting time, it has
two competitors with the same value (10 a.m.). Third, its urgency isnÕt especially high
(latest task starting time is at just 3 p.m.). When one assumes that EVA relies on such
overt characteristics of appointments for their evaluation, then the prospects of the
Printing Office to be visited first are not very good. The other way round, the fact that
EVA fails in PAD task 5, where a deeper assessment of the task configuration in
obviously necessary, demonstrates that the evaluation carried out by EVA is most
likely restricted to overt characteristics of the current PAD task and current stateÓ (p.
91).
EVA indeed relies on such Òovert characteristicsÓ in evaluating appointments. This
evaluation23 is computed as follows:
According to the enhanced evaluation, a maximum end score is calculated for every
operator that could potentially be reached, if that operator were to be applied to the
current situation, and the Delete Operator couldnÕt be applied afterwards. This
constraint is important because without it, one would always be able to reach the
optimal score (p. 43).
The Òmaximum end scoreÓ referred to in this quotation is, in turn, computed analogously to
the evaluation in the PAD System (see also chapter 2): Each Òvery importantÓ appointment
that is carried out is worth eight points, each ÒimportantÓ appointment is worth three points,
and every normal appointment one point.
It should now be clear why it was easier for EVA to find the solution for PAD 4, which
requires to place a very important appointment before a ÒmerelyÓ important one (the
administration before the storehouse).
On the other hand, while 56 % of the human participants placed the Printing Office at the first
position of their final plans, the majority (39%) of the ÒsubjectsÓ simulated by EVA still
prefer the important Conference (Schenck, 2001, p. 85).
Any PAD algorithm that assigns prime relevance to a single criterion will probably encounter
the same problems EVA faces, and will have less difficulty the more the complete solution
corresponds to a ranking of the scheduled appointment according to that criterion. IN PAD 4
and PAD 5, this criterion seems to be not ÒpriorityÓ but ÒurgencyÓ.
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To sum up the Macro-section of this paragraph, I want to state that there are some surprising
similarities between PAD 4 and PAD 5. However, it stands to reason of these similarities are
sufficient to trigger analogical reasoning. PAD 4 and PAD 5, as these two tasks differ too
much in terms of their appointments and the individual times allotted to them. The analysis of
human performance in these two PAD tasks shall serve to qualify that judgement.
Let us now move on to the next (ÔmicroÓ-) section of this paragraph, which is devoted to
inspecting the rules that could possibly be compiled during a PAD session, and the methods
from which they derive.
3.7.2 The Micro level: Constraint Satisfaction Search revisited
I hold the view that both the methods that operate on PAD initially and the rules that are
compiled afterwards are situated at a more basic, or microscopic, level than the rules that take
the appointmentsÕ criteria into account. They are largely made of the mental arithmetic that is
necessary to conduct simple forward search, which has nothing to do with the semantics of
the appointmentsÕ criteria. In the following paragraph I will sketch such a ÒmicroscopicÓ set
of rules that is independent of specific criteria of the appointments and discuss its implications
for rule composition.
 PAD can be stated as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem, as we have seen earlier in this
chapter. There are some heuristics that can deal with Constraint Satisfaction Problems
(Russell & Norvig, 1995, p. 104).
The most constraining variable heuristic finds the variable that is most constraining for the
other variables and assigns a value to it first. In the PAD world, this heuristic would identify
the fixed appointments, determine their time, and place the other appointments around them.
Both in PAD 4 and PAD 5, this fixed appointment is the conference, which will always last
until a fixed time (1.30 p.m. and 0.15 p.m., respectively). As this constraint cannot be
changed, it constrains the placement of the other appointments, because the time-slot
occupied by the fixed appointment must be kept free. The most constraining variable heuristic
would sort the remaining appointments into the categories Òbefore the fixed appointmentÓ,
and Òafter the fixed appointmentÓ, and try to schedule them accordingly.
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The most constrained variable heuristic would select the most urgent appointment and place
it next in the schedule, because its time window is the most narrow, and it is unlikely that the
appointment can be met later.
One could now argue that the two heuristics described above are also heuristics that order the
appointments according to their criteria, and that there is no basic difference between them
and the simple Òranking heuristicsÓ that were criticized above. However, the crucial
difference here is that the CSS heuristics do not establish an actual ordering but instead look
at specific features of the problem as a whole. They identify a constraining appointment, no
matter when it takes place and how important it is, and they select an appointment not because
it is the most urgent one, but because it is more urgent than others are24. Moreover, these
heuristics are merely sufficient establish a preliminary order among the appointments. the
method of forward checking (Russell & Norvig, 1995, p. 84) is necessary to establish the
choice of a next appointment —any choice, at any time.
Forward checking denotes the process of checking in advance whether the assignment of a
value will fatally violate other variablesÕ constraints. What does this mean in the PAD world?
It means that before I move to an appointment, it is tested whether that move will result in
another appointment being ÒimpossibleÓ- that is, whether another appointment will now be
impossible to meet.
This is the ultimate test that determines whether an appointment can be next in schedule or
not. No matter how much a certain heuristic, from CSS or from somewhere else, may suggest
the choice of some appointment —it must be made sure that this appointment will not stand in
the way of another appointment, before that suggestion can be accepted.
My assumption that forward checking is the appropriate method for PAD (sensu Òthe initial
weak methodÓ in Anderson, 1987) is based on AndersonÕ s statement that Òwhich weak
methods can apply and how they apply are determined by what declarative knowledge in
encoded about the problem domainÓ (p. 96).
In the PAD world, the initial knowledge encompasses the necessity to schedule appointments
by moving to them, and the fact that these appointments are constrained and canÕt be met just
any time. This is enough to include a ÒtestÓ in the choice of the next appointment: the forward
check. The mathematical knowledge of adding and subtracting time, translating hours into
minutes etc., is a part of general knowledge. PAD requires no sophisticated knowledge about
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the intrinsically nature of cafes or conferences to enhance performance. Indeed, what it
probably requires most of all is a knack for mathematics.
The steps involved in the kind of forward checking sketched above are the following:
• Choose an appointment
• Determine the current time
• Add the distance between the current location and the chosen appointment to the current
time to obtain the current time + distance.
• Add the duration of the chosen appointment to the current time + distance to
obtain the time after the potential appointment
• Now, for every appointment that hasnÕt been done yet, do the following: Add the distance
between the chosen appointment and the respective not-yet-done appointment to the
time after the potential appointment and see if you arrive in time or not.
This Òmental simulationÓ (cf. Drner, 1989) sounds straining, and it is (see the Discussion in
chapter 5). However, the steps sketched above Òlook aheadÓ only one step, but the
performance of CSS algorithms improves with the extent of forward checking (Dechter &
Frost, 2002). The option to use the car, which further enhances the complexity, isnÕt included
in this sequence either.
The obvious complexity of a systematic forward search makes it implausible that Humans use
it all the time. I will address that question later, but first, I will assume that humans do indeed
apply forward search at least to some extent, and describe the consequences of rule
compilation within this search method.
Firstly, the mathematical rules could combine to produce a speedup of the arithmetic. E.g., the
computation of the Òtime after the potential appointmentÓ could take less time, as the single
steps are carried out in rapid series.
Secondly, the search for the remaining Ònot yet metÓ appointments could become more
routine, e.g. when participants have figured out that houses in which these appointments take
place are still white (the other houses are gray).
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Finally, the distances and the times associated with the appointments remain the same
throughout one PAD task, which means that retrieval (of addition and division facts) could
enter the calculation.
In any case, the result would be quicker and better arithmetic. The rules would be specialists
in pre-calculating times for the purpose of finding a next appointment in the PAD world, and
as such context free and highly task specific.
The identical times that were needed by participants to solve various PAD tasks are no
evidence against the formation of these rules. Anderson (1987, p. 199) reports the result of a
study on skill acquisition and in text editing and explains that Ò(t)he actual time per keystroke
in the execution phase did not decrease in the experiment, although there was some reduction
in the number of keystrokes per edit, reflecting the acquisition of slightly more efficient
procedures. This is exactly the pattern expectedÓ.
However, the fact remains that forward checking is a strain, and it is not plausible that
humans apply it all the time. A relief can be the method of backtracking, which analyzes part
decisions in the search in order to improve its progress. When we translate this statement into
psychological terms, we arrive again at the importance of declarative learning and
exploration. As Anderson (1987, p. 196) states: ÒThe declarative knowledge encoded about
(a) problem domain is again determined by the experiences of the learner: instruction, reading
of text, examples studies, and so onÓ.
 In the final section of this chapter I will therefore explore how declarative learning and the
acquisition of arithmetic skills is connected in the PAD world and must work together to
produce good scheduling behavior.
3.8 Non modo, sed etiam: Procedural and declarative learning in PAD
In the PAD world, moderation indeed is the key. This statement, which should be the motto of
this thesis, gains an additional meaning with regard to the connection between exploration and
forward checking.
Consider exploration first. I have already argued that exploration is necessary to accumulate
(preferably) negative knowledge about PAD, and the feasibility of partial schedules. This is
important because it restricts the search space and is a relief from mental arithmetic. Indeed,
PAD can be used just like a calculator, which receives partial schedules as an input and
outputs the result: Either the schedule is possible —or not.
Unfortunately, however, there is a limit to working memory, and thus to the beneficial value
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inputs them into PAD instead will soon have accumulated an impressive heap of partial
schedules. Indeed, ÒpureÓ systematic exploration in a PAD task would equal an exhaustive
Òblind searchÓ through the permutations of appointments —not a nice thought. But even with
less systematic exploration, chances are that the participant will forget some of his
experiences, or confuse them, drawing wrong conclusions. For example, if a participant
wrongly remembers a schedule as feasible, he will not only end up with an incorrect solution
attempt, but he will also gradually lose his trust in his own memory.
Forward checking, on the other hand, rules out certain solutions without the necessity to Ògo
there and lookÓ. Although the method may be straining at first, it will improve with practice,
and the skill of forward checking will enable the participant to recur to an exploration only if
he has made a mistake in his calculation- in that case, the ÒexplorationÓ will be a forced one.
Forward checking is also an efficient means to rule out certain schedules that start with a
specific appointment a priori, because the very first appointment already renders another one
impossible. In PAD 4 these appointments are the Printing Office and the Conference. In PAD
5, it is the Cafe. Interestingly, in the study described in the next chapter, I found some
scattered partial schedules that start with the Printing Office or the Conference in the data for
PAD 4, but none involving the Cafe in PAD 5.
However, not all appointments can be ruled out that easily. For some appointments, a
hypothetical participant would have to look a few steps in the future to rule out certain
schedules, not just one. This is not only straining, but also carries the additional risk of
calculation errors. Here, previous exploration pays off tremendously. For example, if I have
learned the impossibility of a partial schedule before, it makes no sense to attach that schedule
to a new one and try that ÒcombinationÓ. This specific use of memory is of course only
possible when I have not accumulated too much of it- that is, if I can still overview it.
Thus, it can be seen that procedural and declarative learning can be, and are, most efficiently
employed in connection with each other. Too great a preference for the one not only
diminishes the quality of the other, but also the own — moderation is the key once more. A
recommendation for trying to solve PAD could thus be: Try to check forward from the
beginning, but when you havenÕt found a definite answer after two steps (in the future) — well,
just go ahead and do it.
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4 Modifications of Schedules
In study described in this chapter, the patterns of schedule modifications were analyzed, using empirical data of
43 participants that worked on PAD 4 and PAD 5. Specifically, it was tested if a high number of schedule
modifications is due to the behavior that was described as ÒexplorativeÓ in the preceding chapter. To this end, the
connection between the number of modifications, the number of restarts, the schedulesÕ variety and the mean
length of partial schedules was determined. While there was indeed evidence for the presence of this explorative
pattern in both PAD tasks, it was moderated by the additional impact of the longest modification phase, showing
that explorative schedules are also characterized by longer uninterrupted modifications of individual schedules.
The second objective of data analysis was to investigate how often participants modified their schedules without
being prompted to do so by the PAD system (i.e. without being too late). If the percentage of such deliberate
modifications increases between two PAD tasks, this is an indicator of an increase in forward checking,
especially if the number of modifications itself remains equal.
Analysis of the data collected in this study showed that the number of modifications stayed the same in the two
PAD tasks and that there was indeed a considerable increase in Òdeliberate modificationsÓ. This supports the
assumptions about the acquisition of a PAD specific forward checking skill made in the previous chapter.
A third objective of the data analysis was to test whether some participants consistently exhibited an explorative
planning style. This showed to be not the case: Participants who used many modifications in the first scheduling
session didnÕt necessarily do so in the second. A tentative interpretation in terms of declarative learning is
offered.
In the preceding chapter the explorative pattern of scheduling in the PPAD world was
introduced. It was described as being characterized by many modifications, many restarts
coupled with a high variety, and a shorter average length of the individual partial schedules.
Explorative behavior serves the purpose of accumulating experience and avoiding the dangers
of calculation errors and the strain of forward checking.
Another assumption made in previous chapter concerned the method of forward checking as
initial method to apply in the PAD world. The amount of forward checking bears an obvious
connection to the number of  Òdeliberate modificationsÓ. Deliberate modifications are
modifications that occur without prompting by the PAD system, i.e., participants modify their
schedules before they actually arrive at a dead end. Doing this certainly involves a certain
amount of looking ahead.
However, the measure of deliberate modifications is ambiguous if it is viewed only in the
context of a single task. As we have pointed out in chapter 3, Òun-promptedÓ modifications
can also signify spontaneous changes (ÒopportunisticÓ sensu Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth,
1979) that are not due to mental calculations. Therefore, it is more informative to analyze
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of modifications, restarts and the variety (i.e.: the explorative pattern as a whole) remains
equal. If an increase of deliberate modifications, relative to the total number of modifications,
can be found under these conditions, this indeed indicates an increase in forward checking,
and thus the acquisition of that specific skill. This analysis has been performed and will be
reported in this chapter.
Before addressing the question whether the explorative pattern can really be found in
empirical data, it is interesting to distinguish the explorative pattern from other patterns that
could also yield a high number of modifications. These patterns are not mutually exclusive,
but could be called subspecies of exploration.
4.1 Different Patterns
4.1.1 Many restarts/low variety
One element of explorative scheduling as it is defined in this thesis is the coupling of many
restarts and a high variety. As already explained, may restarts can also be the result of
switching between a few appointments at the beginning of a schedule, which would yield a
low variety. The differences between these two patterns can best be seen by using examples.
They can be seen in figure 4.1.
Explorative Pattern from chapter 3: many
restarts, high variety
• (Storehouse Secretary)
• (Storehouse Conference)
• (Conference)
• (Secretary Conference Storehouse)
• (Secretary Cafe)
• (Cafe)
• (Post Office Cafe)
Pattern with many restarts, low variety
• (Storehouse Secretary)
• (Storehouse Conference)
• (Conference)
• (Storehouse Cafe)
• (Conference Storehouse Cafe)
• (Conference Storehouse Secretary)
• (Conference Post Office)
Figure 4.1: Explorative patterns with many restarts and a high/ low variety.
The explorative pattern with the lower variety, as shown above, would suggest a more
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completely fresh strategy, remindful of opportunistic planning (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth,
1979).
4.1.2 Few restarts
Many modifications could also be the result of many uninterrupted modifications to a
schedule starting with a specific appointment. Again, let me contrast that pattern with the
ÒoriginalÓ explorative pattern described in chapter 3.
Explorative Pattern from chapter 3: many
restarts, high variety
• (Storehouse Secretary)
• (Storehouse Conference)
• (Conference)
• (Secretary Conference Storehouse)
• (Secretary Cafe)
• (Cafe)
• (Post Office Cafe)
Explorative Pattern with few restarts
• (Storehouse conference)
• (Storehouse Cafe Secretary)
• (Storehouse Cafe Conference Secretary)
• (Storehouse Cafe Post Office)
• (Storehouse Secretary Post Office)
• (Storehouse Post Office)
• (Storehouse Cafe)
Figure 4.2.Original explorative pattern, and many modifications/few restarts.
The pattern of many modifications in connection with few restarts makes it obvious that many
modifications can also be the result of the opposite of exploration: of being stuck. This is why
the measure of restarts and variety are important to qualify the number of modifications in
order to unambiguously identify behavior that can truly be called explorative. Another
important measure is the length of the partial schedules. It has already been stated that short
partial schedules are part of the explorative pattern. Let me give a brief explanation.
4.1.3 The importance of modification-length
If the average length of the partial schedules is short, that means that somebody who was
ready to modify them quickly created these schedules. (Remember that in the data format that
was used for this analysis, a new ÒlistÓ is created every time a modification of some kind is
made). On the other hand, if the partial schedules are, on average, longer, this suggests more
local changes to the end of the schedules —especially in connection with few restarts.
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This last point truly highlights the importance of restarts, variety and schedule-length as a
pattern. They canÕt be interpreted individually, but only in relation to each other.
One possible characteristic of the scheduling process hasnÕt been mentioned yet: The longest
modification phase.
4.1.4 The longest modification-phase: Another measure of exploration.
Up until now, it has been implied that the characteristics of many restarts and a high variety
involve quick jumping between the partial schedules, i.e. that a single schedule is only
modified a few times in a row.
This is, however, not compulsory. Many modifications in a row to a schedule can co-exist
with many restarts and a high variety.
The kind of exploration characterized by many restarts, an high variety, and many
ÒuninterruptedÓ modifications to the same schedule in a row would characterize a Òsuper
explorerÓ, who not only inputs his Òchanges of mindÓ (restarts), but also many of the possible
permutations to a single schedule he wants to check.
Another possibility would be a kind of reverse relationship between the variety and the
longest modification phase: Either many modifications are due to (superficial?) exploration of
many different schedules, or a more thorough exploration of a few select schedules.
For these reasons, the measure of the Òlongest modification phaseÓ was included in the
subsequent analyses.
4.2 Method
A study was carried out at the Department of Psychology, University of Heidelberg. A group
of 45 participants, mostly students, took part in that study. Two of them were excluded from
further analysis, as their data show anomalies that are probably due to a dysfunction of the
PCÕs they worked on25.
                                                 
25 Their data, as recorded in the log file, contained sequences like:ÒConference, storehouse, Conference,
Storehouse, Conference, Storehouse, (...)Ó, without any deletions between them, which do not seem reasonable.
As the participants seemed quite ordinary throughout the study, I assume this peculiarity is due to some minor
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Participants were seated in front of a PC and solved first PAD 4 and then PAD 5. They
received chocolates and (optional) course credit for their participation. They were instructed
to read the PAD Instructions carefully. They were not instructed to find the only possible
solution, but only, globally, to Òtry their bestÓ.
In the subsequent data analysis, the Log files created by PAD were transformed into the Lisp-
like format introduced in chapter 2. The measures Ònumber of modificationsÓ, ÒrestartsÓ,
ÒvarietyÓ, Òaverage modification lengthÓ and Òlongest modification phaseÓ were computed for
each participant, both for the log file of his/ her performance in PAD 4 and in PAD 5.
The measures were operationalized as explained in chapter 2.
Additionally, the ratio of deliberate modifications to the total number of modifications was
computed for each participant. It simply gives the percentage of modifications that occurred
before the participants arrived too late at a location, relative to the total number of
modifications created by that participant. Thus, if this ratio is high, that means that the
participant was never too late, if it is low, it indicates more errors, and so on. This measure
was computed by using a Lisp program that simulated the individual modifications.
To analyze the pattern underlying a high number of modifications, the correlations between
the above mentioned measures were computed, both for PAD 4 and PAD 5. To test for the
presence of an explorative planning style across the two tasks, the correlations between PAD
4 and PAD 5 were computed for the individual measures.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Patterns
The correlations between the measures under investigation in summarized in table 4.1 (PAD
4) and table 4.2 (PAD 5).
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Table 4.1:  Correlations between the number of modifications, restarts, variety, mean of
partial schedules and longest modification phase in PAD 4. The asterisks indicate
significance at the level of 0,001 %  according to FisherÕs Z test for correlations.
modifications restarts variety length
Modifications
Restarts .740***
Variety .614*** .794***
Length -.573*** .-543*** -.648***
Longest
modification phase
.578*** .-313 .053 -.343
Table 4.2: This analogical table to table 4.1 depicts the correlations for PAD 5
modifications restarts variety length
Modifications
Restarts .665***
Variety .559*** .836***
Length -.461*** -.516*** -.512***
Longest
modification phase
.761*** .098 -.125 -.248
The pattern of the correlation corresponds to the explorative pattern. Both in PAD 4 and
PAD5, the number of modifications is highly positively correlated with the number of restarts,
and variety, and highly negatively with the average length of the partial schedules. The
measure Òlongest modification phaseÓ is positively correlated with the number of
modifications, in both PAD 4 and PAD 5.
The number of restarts is also highly positively correlated with the variety, and negatively
with the average length of the schedules.
There is no inverse relationship between the variety and the longest modification phase.
The correlation between the number of modifications and the number of restarts/ the variety
seems to weaken somewhat in PAD 5, although it retains its statistical significance. On the
other hand, the correlation between the number of modifications and the longest modification
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phase has increased. The same is true for the correlation between the restarts and the variety,
suggesting an emerging either/ or relation among these measures (see discussion).
4.3.2 Deliberate modifications
Table 4.3 shows the increase in deliberate modifications between PAD 4 and PAD 5. This
increase is considerable. The high number of schedules containing no deliberate
modifications, but instead only partial schedules that are impossible (mode of 0 % deliberate
modifications ) in PAD 4 will be explained in the discussion.
Table 4.3: The ratio of deliberate modifications to the total number of modifications, given in
percentages, for PAD 4 and PAD 5.
PAD 4 PAD 5
Average (%) 41.7 59.6
Median (%) 44.0 58.0
Mode (%) 0.0 100.0
It is important to keep in mind that these statistics are only meaningful if the number of
modifications (and, ideally, the explorative pattern as a whole) remains constant between the
two PAD tasks. As the next paragraph shows, this is indeed the case.
4.3.3 Styles
Table 4.4 shows average of the measures number of modifications, variety, mean schedule
length, restarts, and longest elaboration phase for both PAD 4 and PAD 5, as well as the
correlation between them. The range of each measure is given in the parentheses.
Table 4.4 Correlations between the various measures from PAD 4 and PAD 5. Explanation is given in the text.
Number of
modifications
Number of restarts variety Mean schedule
length
Longest
modification phase
PAD 4 7.5
(1 — 24)
2.0
(0-10)
2.0
(1 — 4)
4.0
(2 — 6)
4. 0
(1 — 18)
PAD 5 7.9
(1 — 24)
2.3
(0 — 10)
2. 5
(1 — 5)
4.0
(3 — 7)
4.3
(1 — 9)
Correlation .203 .247 .151 .137 -.152
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4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 The absence of a scheduling style
The analysis in this study has shown that the general pattern of the scheduling process seems
to remain constant across the two PAD tasks that were used. A high number of modifications
is always negatively correlated to the length of the partial schedules, and positively to the
number of restarts and variety. This establishes the explorative pattern described earlier in this
thesis. The magnitude of the correlations is astounding, if one considers the complexity of the
analyzed data. The positive relation between the number of modifications and the longest
modification phase also is stable across the two PAD tasks. This was no part of the original
explorative pattern, but is no contradiction to it.
Considering the almost uncanny superficial resemblance between the data generated in PAD 4
and PAD 5 (table 4.3), the low correlations for the measures are surprising. Participants who
needed few or many modifications in PAD 4 are not likely to need the same amount of
modifying (and exploration) in PAD 5.
One plausible explanation for this finding is that it is possible to arrive at a fairly good
solution in PAD without meeting all appointments (see chapter 2). As participants were not
instructed to find a complete solution, they may have been satisfied with the first best
schedule they found. Alternatively, they may have found the optimal solution right away, by
sheer luck. In both cases, the positive Òside effectÓ of a longer planning process, namely, the
sharpening of the mathematical swiftness necessary for forward checking is lost to these
participants, so some of them should face problems in the next task (PAD 5).
Participants who took longer (in terms of modifications) in PAD 4 have possibly gained at
least some skills in the process that enabled them to perform better in PAD 5.
To test this assumption, the data created by the ten participants who needed the fewest
modifications, and the ten participants who needed the most modifications, were submitted to
further analysis. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the number of modifications needed by the two
groups of participants in PAD 4 and PAD 5.
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Table 4.5: Modifications needed by the ten ÒbestÓ participants in PAD 4 and PAD 5
Modifications
needed in PAD 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3
Modifications
needed in PAD 5
1 4 10 24 2 5 4 5 4 1
Table 4.6: Modifications needed by the ten ÒworstÓ participants in PAD 4 and PAD 5
Modifications
needed in PAD 4
1
0
13 14 14 17 18 12 21 22 24
Modifications
needed in PAD 5
9 2 13 9 18 7 12 9 12 4
As can be seen, some of the participants who took few modifications in PAD 4 do indeed
need substantially more in PAD 5. On the other hand, of the ten participants who needed
many modifications in PAD 4, nine needed less modifications in PAD 5, the tenth needing
only one modification more (18 instead of 17). As it has already been stated that a direct
(semantic) analogy between the two PAD tasks is unlikely (see chapter 3), these
improvements must be due to the enhancement of procedural skills. This shows that
explorative behavior and procedural skill acquisition are not mutually exclusive.
Note, however, that the correlations in table 4.3 are not inverse. That means that the trend
shown in table 4.4 is not strong enough to cause an inversion of performance. It is, however,
strong enough to disrupt the pattern of Òpeople who always take longÓ, vs. Òpeople who
always get it right immediately.
4.4.2 Forward checking: the emergence of a skill
The increase of deliberate modifications to partial schedules (and thus the avoidance of errors)
is impressive. It is remindful of the dramatic statistics of one-trial learning reported by
Anderson (1987, p. 195). This confirms the assumptions made in chapter 3 about the
application of the method of forward checking in the PAD world, and its improvement.
Interestingly, the number of modifications, the number of restarts, and the other measures
indicating explorative behavior remain stable across the two PAD tasks.
One plausible explanation for this finding could be that participants have acquired the basic
skill of Òlooking aheadÓ in order to detect errors, but they only look ahead a limited number of
t If thi (li it d) l ki h d d Õt d t t bl th t th i h i f
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appointment into the PAD Interface. This is in fact reasonable behavior, as it enables them to
ÒtrainÓ the skill of looking ahead, thus restricting the search space, while at the same time
they make use of the benefits of exploration to relieve working memory (the current schedule
is always displayed on the ÒTerminplanerÓ).
4.4.3 Longest modification phase vs. variety: A subtle trend
In tables 4.1 and 4.1, it shows that the correlation between the longest modification phase and
the number of modifications increases between the two PAD tasks; it is higher in PAD 5. At
the same time, the correlation between the number or restarts and the variety increase as well,
while their correlation with the number of modifications decreases slightly. At the same time,
the correlation between the number of restarts and the variety increases.
This could be interpreted as a subtle trend towards the following distinctions: A high number
of modifications is either due to a longer modification phase of at least one schedule, or to the
original explorative pattern.
While this may sound like a rather daring conjecture, it is nevertheless worth considering. A
longer modification of individual schedules could indicate a more systematic approach to
solving the task, which is still explorative, because it uses the PAD interface as a device to
test schedules and gather experiences. However, given the order of magnitude of the
correlations, the trend between PAD 4 and PAD 5 described in this paragraph is certainly too
subtle to venture predictions for further development. PAD is too complex a task to expect
clear-cut patterns after only two trials. Nevertheless, it points to the interesting option to
expose participants to a longer series of PAD tasks, in order to monitor changes in the
explorative behavior more closely.
Finally, let me counter-argue to the possible statement that, given the equal number of the
modifications needed for PAD 4 and PAD 5, participants do not seem to have learned
anything at all. This is, in fact, not true. Remember that PAD 4 and PAD 5 contain a different
number of appointments to be scheduled (five appointments in PAD 4 and six in PAD 5).
This makes PAD 5 more complex than PAD 4. Viewed in this light, the stability of the
modification patterns across the two tasks can almost be interpreted as an improvement.
4.5 Summary
The number of modifications to a schedule in the PAD task is due to an explorative pattern,
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with different appointments, short partial schedules, and a long series of modifications to at
least one schedule. This pattern is stable across the two PAD tasks that were investigated in
this study. However, the scheduling behavior of participants is not consistent across the two
tasks; there is no planning style. This can be tentatively explained by a slow acquisition of
procedural (forward checking) skills on the part of the explorers, nearly all of which (with one
exception) need less modifications in the second PAD task, and by the fact that some
participants who have arrived at a solution immediately in the first PAD task are performing
considerably worse in the second one, due to their not having acquired task specific skills yet.
The percentage of deliberate modifications to a schedule increases considerably between the
two PAD tasks suggesting the relatively quick development of the skill of forward checking
and error detection. This confirms the assumptions made in chapter 3 about the role of this
method in the PAD world. However, the strategy of searching the through the possible
schedules systematically (which would be signified by longer modification phases) seems to
emerge much slower, if at all. Thus, the total number of modifications needed to find a
solution remains stable. More expositions to PAD would be necessary to enhance the skill of
systematic search in a way that would enable participants to truly exploit their newly acquired
forward checking abilities.
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5 Evaluation of Appointments
In the study described in this chapter, it was investigated how participants evaluate partial schedules (consisting
of only one appointment) in PAD 4 and PAD 5, and, if they are presented with a specific appointment at the
beginning of a schedule, which appointments they insert next. Participants were asked to give reasons for their
evaluations and their choices. The evaluations of the appointments by  participants in this study were compared
to the choices made by participants in the study described in chapter 4. Despite some minor differences, the
evaluations found in this study showed a strong correspondence to the choices found in the previous study. The
analysis of the reasons participants gave for their evaluations and choices was performed in order to establish the
impact of forward checking in the PAD task. While forward checking seems to play a role in the evaluation of
individual appointments, the reasons given for the next choice suggest that different criteria are associated with
the choice of different appointments. This suggests a rather unsystematic search for the next appointment during
scheduling.
In the previous chapter, some empirical evidence was presented that suggested that
participants working with PAD apply the method of forward checking, and that their
application of this method improves between the two PAD tasks.
In the present study, a different approach to data analysis was chosen. Participants were asked
to evaluate partial schedules, which consisted of single appointments from PAD 4 and PAD
526. This evaluation was both numerical (participants were asked to give their score on a
scale) and verbal (participants were asked to give a reason for their evaluation).
The evaluation of (other peopleÕs) schedules is, however, not the same as creating a schedule.
Because of this, participants were also asked to pick a next schedule to insert into the partial
schedules they are presented with, and give their reasons for that choice as well.
The main purpose of this study is to investigate more closely what criteria are crucial in
participantsÕ perception of the appointments in a PAD task. While the task analysis presented
in chapter 3 concluded that content-independent forward checking is the most appropriate
method to select the next appointment during a PAD session, it is still possible that
participants attend to the more ÒobviousÓ criteria (e.g. urgency, priority) of the appointments
after all.
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This preference would not necessarily be a contradiction to the notion of forward checking
(the respective findings presented in chapter 4 can hardly be refuted), but it could suggest a
preliminary selection process that precedes it.
Thus, another objective of this study lies in investigating whether participants systematically
adhere to one criterion in their evaluation and choice of appointments, or not. The explorative
pattern found in chapter 4 suggests they donÕt, but, again, this study was conducted to qualify
these assumptions.
Data analysis will proceed in the following steps.
First, the evaluation of the appointments will be reported and compared to the frequency with
which these appointments were placed at the beginning of a schedule by the participants of
the study described in chapter 4. Only if these correspondences are reasonably large,
conclusion from this study can be drawn to the data patterns found in the chapter 4 study.
To permit a direct comparison, this analysis is restricted to the three appointments that are
featured in PAD 4 and PAD 5. These appointments are the
Printing Office, The Administration and the Conference.
Interestingly, the ÒstatusÓ of these three appointments is quite different in PAD 4 and PAD 5:
While the Administration is the first appointment in the solution of PAD 4, it has the
undesirable quality of rendering another appointment impossible to meet if it is placed at the
beginning of the schedule in PAD 5. The opposite is true for the appointments at the Printing
Office and the Conference. While both of these appointments render another appointment
impossible when placed at the beginning of a schedule in PAD 4, this is not true for PAD 5.
And as we have seen, the appointment at the Printing Office is the first appointment in the
solution to PAD 5.
Next, the reasons participants gave for their evaluations were analyzed by assigning their
answers to categories. These categories were not pre-defined but extracted by abstracting
from the participants written statements.
The same is true for the analysis of the reasons participants gave for their choice of the next
appointments, which is analyzed afterwards.
For reasons of simplicity, this last part of the analysis (reasons given by participants to
explain their next choice) was restricted to the PAD 4 group. However, the results of this
explorative analysis are quite promising.
How humans solve scheduling problems
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants
20 participants were assessed for this study, mostly students from the University of
Heidelberg. They received sweets and (optional) course credit for their participation.
Participants were randomly assigned to two groups. These groups differ with regard to the
PAD task participants had to work with and shall therefore be called ÒPAD 4 groupÓ (N= 10)
and ÒPAD 5 groupÓ (N= 10). This decision was made to permit the identification of
differences between the two tasks, or systematic correspondences between them with regard
to the reasons given for the evaluation of the appointments. Apart from the context of the
PAD task, the treatment was identical for the two groups. It is sketched below.
5.1.2 Treatment
Participants were seated in front of an Apple Computer and presented with the ÒtrainingÓ trial
and either PAD 4 or PAD 5, to become more familiar with PAD. After they had worked with
their respective task five minutes, they were told that they were now to evaluate the quality of
the beginnings of schedules created by Òother participantsÓ (they were of course fictitious).
They were told that these participants had worked with the same PAD task as they had
themselves (that is, PAD 4 or PAD 5, respectively).
They were presented with a little booklet, containing five partial schedules, each consisting
only of one single appointment at the start. In the PAD 4 group, these appointments were the
ones that had to be scheduled in PAD 4, and in the PAD 5 group, they were the ones that had
to be scheduled in PAD 5. The partial schedules were presented in form of a screenshot,
which showed the Òlittle squareÓ of the other participant at the respective appointment, and
the state of the PAD world.
This mode of presentation was chosen to enhance the comparability between this study and
the one described in the previous chapter. This screenshot provides all relevant information
for an evaluation (cf. Chapter 2): The other appointments that have yet to be done and their
criteria, the current time, the distances. Participants in this study have exactly the same
information as the participants in the chapter 4 study. Due to their introductory training
session, they were able to interpret the screenshot correctly. The instruction sheets for the
PAD 4 group can be inspected in Appendix 1.
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Participants were offered a scale from 1 to 6 to score the partial plans, Ò6Ó being equivalent to
the judgement Òvery promisingÓ, Ò1Ó being equivalent to the statement Ònot promising at allÓ.
In Addition, they were asked to state the reasons for their evaluations by simply writing them
down.
After that they were asked which appointment they would insert next in the partial schedule
they had just evaluated, and give their reasons for this as well.
The instruction sheets for the PAD 4 group and the PAD 5 group differed in one aspect.
Participants of the PAD 5 group were simply presented with five partial schedules, each
placing one of PAD 5Õ s five scheduled appointments at the start. As it is not possible to place
an appointment at the ÒOfficeÓ at the start of a schedule, this appointment was left out in this
group.
Participants of the PAD 4 group were also presented with partial schedules consisting of one
appointment, with one exception. Remember that the complete solution starts with the
administration. In that case, the ÒdifficultÓ (cf. Chapter 3) three steps of the solution were
presented to the participants, i.e. the schedule they were supposed to evaluate was
Administration, Car, Storehouse.
The purpose of this minor manipulation was to see if participants of the PAD 4 group would
evaluate the only solution of their task better than the participants of the PAD 5 group (who
were just presented with its first appointment:
Printing Office.
If this should prove to be the case,  this could be an indicator for the importance of taking the
counter-intuitive first step, and for the easy detectability of the correct schedule after that step.
However, if the partial schedule starting with the Printing Office (PAD 5) were evaluated
equally good as the partial schedule starting with the Administration (PAD 4), the additional
information given to the PAD 4 group would not be as crucial (and a neat argument made in
chapter 3 would be refuted).
5.2 Results
As each of the 20 participants evaluated five partial schedules, the evaluations encompass 100
data points; that is 50 data points for the PAD 4 and PAD 5 group, respectively. Only the
three appointments that featured in both tasks (Conference printing office and administration)
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were compared with respect to their evaluations, which means that 60 data points entered this
comparison (30 per PAD group).
The selection of the next appointment is analyzed for each of the five partial schedules in both
PAD groups and thus encompasses again the original 100 data points (50 per PAD group).
The reasons given for the selection of the next appointment is only analyzed for the PAD 4
group, and is thus based on 50 data points.
5.2.1 Evaluation of the partial schedules
Table 5.1 shows how the appointments ÒPrinting OfficeÓ, ÒAdministrationÓ and ÒConferenceÓ
were evaluated by both groups of participants. Furthermore, it is also reported how many of
the modifications created by the participants of the previous study27 start with these
appointments.
It can be seen that there is a correspondence between the scores and the number of
modifications, which, however, is better for PAD 4 than for PAD 5.
Table 5.1: Evaluations of three appointments in this study (average values), compared with the number of
modifications starting with these appointments created in the previous study
PAD 4 PAD 5
Administration Conference Printing Office Administration Conference Printing Office
Score
(this study)
5.6 1.5 2.3 2.2 3.9 4.9
# modifications
(previous study)
126 2 12 60 71 72
5.2.2 Choice of the next appointments
Table 5.2 reports the choice of the next appointment selected by the participants of the PAD 4
group. The appointments that were presented to them are listed in the leftmost column. The
cells of the table contain the observed frequencies for the combinations of appointments.
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Table 5.2: Observed frequencies for the choice insertion of a next appointment into the partial plans that ere
presented to the PAD 4 group
Options for a next choice
Conference Administration Secretary Storehouse Printing Office Delete
Administration 10 --- 0 0 0 0
Printing Office 8 1 0 0 --- 1
Conference --- 1 0 0 6 2
Storehouse 2 0 5 --- 3 0
Secretary 3 1 --- 5 0 1
Total 23 3 5 5 9 4
All participants of the PAD 4 group selected the ÒconferenceÓ as the next appointment after
the partial schedule starting with the administration. One reason for this is the nature of this
Òpartial scheduleÓ. Remember that it did not just contain the appointment at the
administration, but the start of the complete solution, i.e. ÒAdministration, Car, StorehouseÓ.
This is very probably the reason why the conference was picked so often as a next choice for
the partial schedule starting with the administration, in the PAD 4 group —and not the
storehouse
Table 5.4 shows the analogous information to table 5.2, this time for the PAD 5 group.
Table 5.4: Observed frequencies of the next choices selected by participants of the PAD 5 group (N= 45, due to
some missing values (participants didnÕt give a second choice).
Options for a second choice
Administration Conference Printing Office Central Office Cafe Office
Administration 0 2 1 3 1 1
Conference 0 --- 6 0 1 2
Printing Office --- 8 --- 1 0 1
Central Office 0 6 0 --- 0 2
Cafe 0 2 2 4 --- 1
Total 0 18 9 8 2 7
The frequencies of the delete option were not included in tables 5.4 and tables 5.5, because
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schedule. In the PAD 4 group this happened slightly more often, which is why the operator
was included in tabled 5.2 and 5.3.
5.2.2 Reasons given by participants for their evaluations
The reasons that were given by participants in both PAD groups for their evaluations are
shown in table 5.5.
In order to interpret this table properly, the transformation of the written statements that were
produced by the participants into quantitative data must be explained.
In a first step, it was tried to abstract from the written statements in order to develop a system
of categories. In this stage, it was tried to identify ÒclassesÓ of reasons that participants
mentioned. The aim was to find categories that were as mutually exclusive as possible.
Another goal was to restrict the number of categories, in order to avoid a too complex analysis
(that would be too arcane to be appreciated by the outside reader anyway).
I found that most statements made by the participants mentioned reasons that can be classified
into the categories that are listed below. I am aware of the dangers that lie in defining such
categories rather ad hoc and will address that issue in the discussion.
• Other appointments. This category encompasses statements about the possibility to meet
other appointments in the future. The connection to forward checking is obvious. The
other categories should be self-explaining.
• Priority of the current appointment {that was to be evaluated}.
• Current Position
• Current time
• Priority of at least one other appointment
Up until now, these reasons have little to do with evaluation. This element was added in the
second step of the analysis of participantsÕ statements. During the inspection of these
statements, it became obvious that the same reasons were mentioned in connection to positive
evaluations and negative evaluations. For example, Òother appointmentsÓ can be the reason
given for a positive evaluation, as in ÒI like that start to a schedule, because it will be possible
to meet many other appointmentsÓ. It can also serve to explain a negative evaluation, as in
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ÒThat start to as schedule is not good, because now many appointments canÕt be met
anymoreÓ.
The same is true for the other reasons listed above. The priority of an appointment can lead to
a positive evaluation: ÒThis schedule is good, because I have already met an important
appointmentÓ. It can also lead to a negative one: ÒThis schedule is bad, because this
appointment is unimportant.Ó The other reasons can be transformed into negative and positive
statements analogously.
The next goal was to determine how participants used the above-listed reasons to explain their
evaluation of the three investigated appointments.
To do this, the following transformation was performed:
For each statement, it was coded whether a participant had mentioned the reasons listed
above, and, if that was the case, if he had done so in a negative or a positive connotation.
Thus, each of the 5 categories listed above received a ÒscoreÓ from each statement. That score
was
• Ò1Ó, if the reason was not mentioned
• Ò0Ó, if the reason was mentioned to explain why the partial schedule in question was bad
(negative connotation)
• Ò2Ó, if the reason was mentioned to explain why the partial schedule in question was good
(positive connotation)
Afterwards, these scores were summed up and divided by the number of participants.
The resulting scores for the categories, shown in table 5.5, can now be interpreted like this: A
Score below 1 (close to 0) indicates that a reason from the respective category was mentioned
to explain why the appointment in question was bad. A score above 1 indicates the opposite:
A reason from the respective category was used to explain why the respective appointment
looks good at the start of the schedule.
A score of (approximately) 1 can either indicate that the respective category plays no role in
evaluating a particular appointment, or that participantsÕ judgements differ and the scores are
averaged out.
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Table 5.5: Reasons given for the evaluations of the appointments for the PAD 4 and the PAD 5 group. The
scores that were given to the appointments in the different groups are displayed in parentheses below them.
Explanation on how to read the table is given in the text.
PAD 4 group PAD 5 group
Administration
(5.6)
Printing office
(2.3)
Conference
(1.5)
Administration
(2.2)
Printing Office
(4.9)
Conference
(3.9)
Other
appointments
1.8 .5 .3 .4 1.4 1.6
Priority
(Current)
1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 .9 1.1
Position 1.0 1 1 .9 1.5 1
Priority (Other) 1.2 .8 .6 .6 1.5 .9
Current time 1.5 .8 .6 .6 1.5 .9
This table shows that reasons that refer to Òother appointmentsÓ mirror the evaluation of the
appointments most closely. They are used to explain the ÒqualityÓ of the administration
appointment, and the lack of quality of the schedules starting with the conference and the
printing office (PAD 4 group). The almost exactly reversed pattern is evident for the PAD 5
group.
The other categories do not offer such a clear correspondence to the actual score. The
Categories ÒCurrent timeÓ and ÒPriority (other)Ó are closest to such a correspondence.
This blurry picture is due to the fact most participants only give one reason for their
evaluations and do not consistently give the same reason all the time. Moreover, it is simply
due to the fact that different participants give different reasons for their evaluations. However,
this topic belongs in the discussion section.
5.2.3 Reasons given by participants for their next choices
The method that was used to extract the reasons participants gave for their next choices from
their written statements was similar to the one that was used in the previous paragraph. In the
first step, categories of reasons were established. These were found to be the following:
• Other appointments (again)
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•  Priority (of the chosen appointment; the subsequent criteria refer to the chosen
appointment as well)
• Duration
• Position
• Urgency
Interestingly, these categories conform more closely to the criteria of the appointments that
were given in the task instructions.
In contrast to the categories of evaluation presented in the preceding paragraph, the categories
presented here are a priori ÒpositiveÓ, i.e. if they are mentioned, they are mentioned in favor
of the chosen appointment. For this reason, the coding of the categories was slightly different:
A category was simply assigned a Ò1Ó if it was mentioned in favor of an appointment, and a
Ò0Ó, if they werenÕt mentioned. Afterwards, they were summed up and averaged.
Thus, if a category receives a score above 0 in the context of an appointmentÕ s choice, it
means that a reason from the respective category speaks in favor of that appointment.
Table 5.6 summarizes the results of this analysis.
Table 5.6: Reasons given by participant of the PAD 4 group for their next choices. The leftmost column contains
the ÒnextÓ choices made by participants; the column headed ÒNÓ holds the number of times this choice was
actually made by participants. More explanation can be found in the text.
Categories of reasons
N Other
appointments
priority duration Position Urgency
Conference 24 .3 .4 0 .15 .25
Administration 3 0 .3 0 0 0
Secretary 5 .4 0 .4 .6 0
Storehouse 5 .6 .2 0 .2 .2
Printing Office 9 .6 .3 0 .2 .1
Delete 4 .2 0 0 0 0
This table can be read in two ways. Firstly, the frequency with which reasons from the
individual categories were mentioned at all can be seen in the columns. Inspecting the rows,
one can identify the connection between the next choices and the categories.
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For example, the category Òother appointmentsÓ was mentioned most often to justify a choice
and the category ÒdurationÓ least often.
The choice of the ÒSecretaryÓ as the next appointment seems to be connected to the criteria
ÒpositionÓ and ÒdurationÓ (remember that the secretary was only Òchosen nextÓ after the
appointment at the storehouse; it is close to the storehouse, and, in PAD 4, lasts only 10
minutes). The choice of the ÒStorehouseÓ and the ÒPrinting OfficeÓ, however, seems to be
connected to the category of Òother appointmentsÓ.
On average, one reason was given by participants to explain their next choices. This explains
the subtlety of the effects.
5.3 Discussion
It cannot be denied that the results presented in this study can be called tentative at best. The
design of the study carries some problematic aspects that I will discuss now. However,
afterwards I will nevertheless comment on two interesting findings made in this study: The
impact of Òthe other appointmentsÓ on both evaluation and choice, and the difference between
the kinds of statements made by the participants in the evaluation and the choice context.
5.3.1 Problematic methodical aspects
 It is always a risk to define categories for verbal or written statements ad hoc. Chances are
that another person, presented with the same data, would come up with a completely (or
maybe not completely, but at least somewhat) different set of categories. I have offered no
measure of the inter-rater reliability of the categories presented here, and I have the suspicion
that, due to the eclectic nature of the coding (Ò1, 0, 2Ó), this reliability would not be
overwhelming.
However, I do think that for the purposes of exploration, it is legitimate to propose a system
like the categories described in this study. I do not hold the view that they implement a
specific theory, nor do I claim that the findings presented in this study confirm or refute a
particular theory. The purpose of the present analysis was simply to ask participants why do
what they do, and for this purpose, the approach of Òverbal common senseÓ is enough.
Nevertheless, there are interesting ways to modify the categories presented in this study and
qualify them further. One way would (of course) be to involve multiple raters; another one
could be to present participants with a list of reasons for their evaluations and let them check
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Another problem that arose in this study is that participants were ÒforcedÓ to give next choices
for partial schedules they actually deemed Ònot promisingÓ. This biases the choice of next
appointments, as well as the reasons given for them. Although participants had the
opportunity to say that they wanted to delete the appointment they were presented with and
start anew, they were not explicitly prompted to this possibility, and thus they may have bot
used it each time they Òfelt like itÓ. A possibility to cope with his situation would be to
exclude appointments that were evaluated as ÒbadÓ from the analysis of the next choices.
5.3.2 The impact of the Òother appointmentsÓ: An indicator of forward checking?
Both in the evaluation of appointments and the choice of the next appointments, the Òother
appointmentsÓ play a major role. What does this mean? It means that is it crucial for the
evaluation of the appointments whether other appointments (that still have to be scheduled)
can still be met. If that is the case, the appointment is evaluated positively, if it is not the case,
it is evaluated negatively. This, to a certain degree, confirms the importance of forward
checking in the PAD world, although this finding has to be qualified somewhat.
Firstly, the number of other appointments that are mentioned in the Òevaluation partÓ of the
study is, on average, just one. Table 5.7 holds the relevant information.
Table 5.7: Number of other appointments mentioned by participants evaluating the appointments
Appointments to be evaluated
Administration Conference Printing Office
N u m b e r  o f  o t h e r
appointments mentioned
(PAD 4 group)
.7 1.1 1.4
N u m b e r  o f  o t h e r
appointments mentioned
(PAD 5 group)
.9 .3 1
Furthermore, the category Òother appointmentsÓ also encompasses statements like ÒThat
schedule is bad, because I canÕt go to appointment x, as it is already too late.Ó This is not
necessarily a sign of forward checking, as this would direct the judgement exclusively into the
future, while the quotation simply states a present sate. It was sometimes hard to separate
these two kinds of arguments, which is why I chose to compact them into one category. The
dominance of this category is not contradictory to the presence of forward checking, but
How humans solve scheduling problems
say that the feasibility of other appointments is more crucial to the way a schedule is
perceived that the criteria of the schedule that has already been produced. It would be
interesting to see if this is also true for the evaluation of longer partial schedules.
5.3.3 Different reasons for evaluation and choice
There are different categories of reasons given for the evaluation of partial schedules and the
choice of appointments.
They are reviewed in table 5.8:
Table 5.8:
Categories for the Evaluation Categories for the choice of the next appointment
• Other appointments
• Priority (current)
• Priority (other)
• Current time
• Current position
• Other appointments
• Priority
• Duration
• Position
• Urgency
While the reasons given for the choice of the next appointment focus on the criteria of that
appointment, the reasons given for the evaluation suggest that participants assess the PAD
world as a whole. The implications of the Òother appointmentsÓ have already been discussed.
The other categories for the evaluation point in the same direction, apart from the ÒCurrent
PriorityÓ.  The category Òpriority (other)Ó contains statements that explicitly mention another
important appointment that can(not)  be met, categories Òcurrent timeÓ and Òcurrent positionÓ
contain statements concerning the fact that little/ too much time has be used yet by the partial
schedule (Òcurrent timeÓ) and that the current position is close to/ too far away from other
appointments.
On the other hand, this comprehensive assessment is lacking in the Categories for the choice
of the next appointment. One possible explanation for this is that the evaluation of a schedule
involves a different kind of reasoning that the justification of a choice. In the former situation,
participants were asked to evaluate how promising they judge the appointments to be. It is
obvious that this wording of the question evokes reasoning processes that probe into the
future, checking what kind of situation the placement of a specific appointment at the
beginning of a schedule could probably lead to. In the latter situation, participants have to
justify something they have already done Moreover they are answering the last question on
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the page. The criteria of the appointments (remember that they are visible on the screen, as
they are displayed in the roofs of the houses) offer themselves as Òquick and dirtyÓ reasons to
justify their choices. Another possibility is that, in different situations, specific appointments
Òstand outÓ and offer themselves as the next choice, because on single criterion speaks so
much in their favor. An example for this would be the preference to insert the appointments at
the SecretaryÕ s office into the schedule behind the appointment at the storehouse, although it
is not important, lasts only 10 minutes, and can be met until 4 p.m. (in the PAD 4 context).
Another example would be the strong preference for the conference in PAD 5, the conference
being a fixed appointment that has to be met rather early, thus standing out as well.
The preference for the adherence to different criteria in different situations is remindful of the
pandemonium of Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Rothian planning specialists (1979): Pick the
appointment whose criteria scream loudest: ÒTake me!Ó.
As it has already been stated in the introductory passage to this chapter, this would not
invalidate the notion of forward checking as the basic method in the PAD world (for more
informal evidence on the application of that method, see paragraph below). Rather, it would
suggest that participants restrain their search by applying some preliminary selection.
Alternatively, participants may conduct systematic forward checking for a while, and if this
doesnÕt yield a clear choice, they decide according to the criteria mentioned above. The only
way to differentiate between these two explanations would be the use of verbal protocols.
This is not as far-fetched as it may sound now. Participants who gave me feedback about the
experiment after the debriefing said that they found it straining to evaluate the partial
schedules, since the only way to properly do that was to —forward check as many possible
schedules starting with that appointment as possible. That left little energy for an elaborate
justification of their next choices. That doesnÕt mean that participants didnÕt ponder them
carefully; my observations during the experiment suggested that they did so, very much.
However, the reasons given for the next appointments were often very general (Òbecause it
fits in the scheduleÓ, Òbecause it is the only optionÓ). This points to another reason for brevity,
apart from exhaustion. Perhaps participants found the next appointment during the mental
simulations involved in evaluating the partial schedules, and were so immersed in their
thoughts that they found this choice too obvious to explain —which resulted in the ÒgeneralÓ
statements quoted above.
This surprised me, as I had expected participants to make spontaneous choices, without much
thi ki ( I ld h d ) I h d ith d ti t d ti i t Õ ti ti th
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complexity of PAD (after having dissected it for this thesis for such a long time). The strain of
the Ònon-interactiveÓ paper-and-pencil evaluation of partial schedules prompted me once
more to the beneficial characteristics of the PAD Interface, which enables participants to
check partial schedules directly —to explore. A number of participants said that they had
enjoyed the introductory PAD session (on the computer), during which they could try out
some schedules, but had had a hard time during the evaluation part. One reason for this was
that they found themselves unable to remember the beginnings of schedules they were
currently simulating, and so had to start over again.
Many of the ideas about the importance of exploration were inspired by the post-debriefing
discussions with participants in this study.
5.4 Summary
In this study, the criteria according to which participants evaluate partial schedules and
choose the next appointment to be inserted into them were investigated. The feasibility of the
remaining other appointments is an important factor in the evaluation of partial schedules,
while more appointment-specific criteria play a role in choice. This latter finding can
tentatively be explained as follows: either do participants use the criteria to restrict their
forward checking, or they refrain to the use of the criteria when forward checking hasnÕt
yielded a clear choice after some steps. These two explanations can only be differentiated by
using verbal protocols.
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6 Conclusions
Many interesting things were discovered in this thesis. Personally, I like the ideas about the
connection between declarative and procedural learning, between exploration and skill
acquisition the best, and sincerely hope that they will be used and scrutinized further, either
by me or by another researcher.
As this thesis contains a lengthy introduction, and an abstract at the start of each chapter, I
will not be as redundant to summarize my findings here. Instead I want to devote this last
chapter to three implications of the ideas and findings presented in this work. The first is an
attempt to answer the question ÒIs human scheduling any good?Ó. The second implication
concerns the interpretation of performance in the PAD task. The third implication concerns
itself with possible cognitive models of the Plan-A-Day task. Let me discuss these topics in
reverse order.
6.1 Implications for Cognitive Modeling
Some time (actually, some years ago even!), I tried to create an ACT-R model of human
behavior in the Plan-A-Day task. Faced with the complexity of the empirical data, I was at a
loss about how to detect some order in this chaos, how to find something simple and elegant
that could be modeled. Eventually, I carried my ambition all the way to Pittsburgh, to the
ACT-R summer school, where my mentor Jon Fincham and me finally produced a working
model. This model28 basically implemented various rules that selected an appointment
according to different criteria (e.g. earliest start time, urgency etc.), along with a very basic
forward checking method that looked one step into the future. The model also contained some
simple backup strategies, for example, it took the car when it was too late, and a set of
stopping rules that declared the scheduling process finished, even if no optimal solution was
found (something participants also tend to do, and rightly so). Our model produced schedule
processes that looked reminiscent of the human log-files in their variability and their chaos.
Nevertheless, it contained no theoretically based elements, the choices it made were purely
random. Its implementation was based on some common sense ideas I had about scheduling,
and on the necessity to fit the human data at least superficially. It did not contain declarative
or explorative learning either. Exasperated, I gave up.
                                                 
28 Available on the Homepage of the Department for Experimental and Theoretical Psychology, University of
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During the writing of this thesis, I often thought back on that modeling effort, because many
things I discovered and (finally) understood suggest quite interesting and elegant ways to
model human behavior in PAD. The key discovery here is certainly the connection between
declarative and procedural learning. Although the development of a Cognitive Model is not
possible anymore, given the time frame of this thesis, I will nevertheless sketch at this place
how such a model could be constructed.
A cognitive model should start out with two basic strategies (or production rules)29, one that
implements forward checking and one that implements ÒpureÓ exploration. The latter will just
pick an appointment, place it in the schedule, and wait for feedback. If a negative feedback
occurs, it will be stored in memory. The former will involve a series of productions that
perform the arithmetic steps of forward checking. In the beginning, the exploration strategy
will be preferred, as it requires less effort. However, as the negative feedback increases, the
forward checking strategy will get its chance to be applied, leading to the proceduralization of
the calculation-steps involved in forward checking.
The connection between exploration and forward checking could be implemented by the use
of retrieval: The forward-checking productions could check whether there already was an
experience matching the current calculation (e.g. a partial schedule that is not possible, the
sum of some distance, the result of the Òdivide by threeÓ option that is applied when the car is
used...). If this is the case, the calculation can stop and the result (Òthis schedule will NOT
work!Ó) can be returned directly, leading to faster decisions and a lower number of errors. The
fact that there always is exploration can be implemented by restricting the forward-check to
one or two steps in the future. This guarantees the creation of new experiences, which is so
important in the PAD world, while at the same time furthering the acquisition the crucial
forward-checking skill. Thus, ÒpureÓ exploration gradually changes into forward checking
that uses examples from memory to enhance its performance. A remaining unknown is the
exact criterion for a restart. When and why so participants decide to try another schedule?
This needs further investigation.
This is of course just a brief sketch of a model. The actual implementation would probably
have to deal with more complexities. I nevertheless hope that this brief sketch has made the
constructive value of the declarative/procedural connection made in this thesis somewhat
clear.
                                                 
29 In this discussion I assume the Cognitive Model in question to be implemented in ACT R however this is not
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6.2 Interpretation of the Performance in PAD
This thesis offers an additional way to assess the performance of participants: The difference
between the number of modifications needed for the first PAD task and the number of
modifications needed for the second. This could qualify the more coarsely grained measures
of performance. Remember that in PAD, it is possible to arrive at a good solution by accident
as well as by Ògood schedulingÓ. The number of modifications needed in the second tasks
gives a hint whether the former or the latter is true. As we have seen, some participants
arrived at their solution very fast in PAD 4, but needed much more modification in PAD 5.
That pattern could indicate that the good performance in the first trial was due to a lucky
accident. This allows for a direct transgression to the following and final question posed in
this thesis:
6.3 Is human scheduling any good?
The answer to that question must be a most empathic ÒYesÓ. The quality of human scheduling
is not s much a matter of the score people eventually achieve, but a matter of how they deal
with the task, from beginning to end. It is a matter of the scheduling process.
I think the exploration employed by participants in the PAD world is a very intelligent and
neat strategy. Participants exploit the option to test their schedules that is provided by the
PAD Interface. That they nevertheless seem to employ forward checking in order to avoid
dead-ends, and learn it so quickly between just two trials, is an additional finding that filled
me with admiration. Remember that the PAD-Instructions mention five (PAD 4) and six
(PAD 5) appointments, each associated with various criteria, each of which is somehow
relevant in real life. Additionally, there is the option to take the car, which further complicates
matters. Finally, a direct transfer between the two PAD tasks is not possible. Given this
complex scenario, the participantsÕ exploration, combined with their acquisition of the
forward checking skill, shows almost heroic motivation and persistence.
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